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INTRODUCTION   
This study investigates the economic-technological structure of Norway’s coastal cod fishery. 
0.1 The background: a tragedy in the Barents Sea? 
The Barents Sea ecosystem is a part of the Arctic Ocean, approximately bordered by the 
Norwegian Sea and Svalbard in the west, Franz Josef Land and the Artic Sea in the north, the 
so called Kara Sea east and Norway and Russia south. Situated in the sub-arctic climate zone, 
it covers 1,405,000 square kilometres of surface and with an average depth of 230 meters it is 
rather shallow. Its floor is covered by sand and silt. Two water masses meet in the Barents 
Sea: Atlantic, high saline mild water from the south hits Arctic, cold low saline water from 
the north. These physical conditions enable biologically rather simple but extremely 
productive food webs with plankton and algae (primary production) at the bottom, krill, 
various pelagic species such as capelin and herring, bottom feeding species like haddock and 
cod and mammals like whales and seals (Stiansen et al., 2005, p.9 Nakken, 1998, p.26-7). At 
the end of the food chain stands an old friend: the Barents Sea for centuries has provided fish 
for the “greatest marine predator” (Grafton et al., 2006 p. 701). Millions of tons of wild fish 
inhabiting it are nowadays yearly harvested for human consumption (Nakken, 1998, p.23-6). 
In addition, along the coast aquaculture makes use of the favourable conditions. But not only 
fish is directly provided by the Barents Sea. Under the bottom of the ocean, rich oil reserves 
are found. Extraction of those may provoke conflicting user interests since for example an oil 
spill may kill large fish populations. (Zhang, 2007, Hjermann et al., 2007a) Furthermore, 
besides those direct usages, the Barents Sea also provides a range of indirect services to 
mankind, of which some may be not well understood or do not receive attention. 
 
Fishing accounts for not even a single per cent of the Norwegian annual gross national 
product (SSB, 2005). But as a historical industry shaping the Norwegian identity and culture 
by delicacies such as 'lutefisk' or charming places such as Tromsø its importance is not well 
reflected by that piteous number. The Norwegian fisheries, fishery policy, as well as academia 
theorising about those two, direct most of their attention on the North-East Arctic cod 
(NEAC). This has been termed the “cod-focus” (in Norwegian: “torskefokus”) (NOU, 2006, 
p.66). The reason for the special attention is from an economic perspective simple: it is the 
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species which creates most income. The stocks are large and it is nutritious and tasty (EFF 
Norsk Sjømat, 2006), creating a craving for it around the world: about 90 per cent of the 
Norwegian catch is exported (FAO, 2007a).  
 
The species in the spotlight, its Latin name being gadus morhua, is a bottom feeder living in 
water temperatures just above 0° Celsius, south of the so called polar front (where the Barents 
Sea meets the Arctic Ocean). It is a predator feeding mainly on young herring and capelin 
and, if those are rare, young own specimen. Following its prey it migrates with the melting of 
the polar ice in spring and the freezing in autumn. Maturing at an age of six to eight years it 
spawns in spring in the pelagic waters along the coast between 62° and 71° north. The eggs 
and later larvae drift northwards reaching eventually the Barents Sea. It is preyed upon as a 
juvenile (below the age of three) not only by its own elders but also herring (Nakken, 1998, 
p.27-8; Fisheries.no, 2007; Hermann et al., 2007a, 2007b). 
 
Long into the first half of the last century, it appeared that the amounts of fish provided by the 
oceans were ‘limitless’. And taking account of the possibilities to fish, they kind of were. 
Fishing took place exclusively along the coast during spawning season, but the juvenile fish 
could grow up undisturbed from humans in the open sea. The fishing means did not suffice to 
threaten the natural cycle. But with the advent of modern technologies, so called trawlers that 
operated offshore, the ability to catch fish exploded. In the 1950s, the first commercially used 
fish stocks around the world were overfished and had collapsed. Why would the fishermen, 
who depended on the stocks and could foresee the development to a certain extent, let that 
happen? The answer given by Gordon (1954, in: Conrad, 1995, p.405) laid the foundation for 
fishery economics: No or badly defined property rights and self-interested fishermen, later 
known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968 in: Ostrom, 1990, p.2), 
 
Fish is in an economic sense a renewable resource that is scarce: less is at some point in time 
available than can be put into use. The scarcity creates a so called resource rent: the benefits 
of harvesting can exceed its costs. Secondly, the biological dynamics, maturation (individual 
growth) and spawning (population growth), create an intertemporal trade-off: today’s fishing 
affects tomorrow’s stocks. However, fishermen only interested in their private profits do best 
by fishing as much as possible immediately: caught fish is realized gain, the in situ resource 
has no value: it is a common resource and some other fisher could catch it. This lack of 
ownership leads to neglect of the dynamics and erosion of the resource rent, a failure termed 
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intertemporal externality. It may provoke economic overfishing, more than welfare-
economically optimal, or even biological overfishing, the threat of or extinction of the stock.   
 
So how did the cod stocks around the world do? The picture is mixed. In the North-West, the 
fishery of Newfoundland collapsed in the 1980s and has not recovered ever since (Asche et 
al., 2005, p.2). The NEAC in comparison has done rather well and is regarded as being within 
safe biological limits (Fisheries.no, 2007). But in 2007 the scientific catch recommendations 
have been drastically corrected downwards (ICES, 2007, p.129). Is this just simply the result 
of unanticipated large biological fluctuations (much of what is happening underwater is not 
yet understood) or the impact fishing has had?  
 
To protect the stock and secure profitable fishing, hence to avoid the situation described 
above, both stocks named above are ‘managed’. The fishermen are restricted by regulations in 
their activities, suggesting that the problem is not solved or may be of a different kind. Actual 
management of the NEAC stocks is jointly done by Russia and Norway who annually agree 
upon how much to catch. Norway then divides its share among its two fleet segments: high 
sea and coastal (Armstrong, 1998).  
0.2 Fish academia: literature  
How should the stocks be fished? Economists suggest some dynamic bio-economic 
optimisation, maximising the ‘social welfare’ derived from the fishery over time. The first 
such model by Schaefer (1957 in: Perman et al., 2003, p.558) was formalised for example by 
Clark and Munro (1975) and enriched with capital rigidity by Clark et al. (1979) (later refined 
by Boyce, 1995). Biological variability was added by Charles and Munro (1985) (refined by 
Singh et al., 2004). Taking account of the inner structure of the fish stock by means of year 
classes of different size and weight are Beverton-Holt type models (for example in 
Hannesson, 1978). For the Norwegian cod fishery among others Sandal and Steinshamn 
(2002) and most recently Diekert (2007) and Zhang (2007) have employed such models. 
These models obviously require an understanding of the ecosystem. The most recent 
biological model for the NEAC, its physical environment and the species it interacts with is 
Hjermann et al. (2007b).  
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A second input to such modelling is to not only understand what the fish are up to – but also 
the fishermen2. There are from an economic point of view many dimensions to fishermen 
behaviour: rigid capital and biological uncertainty require modelling of the individual 
investment decision for example. Fishermen have to choose fishing grounds and how often to 
take the vessel out on a trip. They can decide whether to obey a regulation or not. And finally, 
fishermen determine which inputs to use, which species to target. Economists have been 
extensively employing the neoclassical static theory of the firm framework to explain the 
latter behaviour (an overview is found in Pascoe and Mardle, 2005). Special attention is often 
paid to the impact regulations have on the incentives for fishermen. Regulation may not solve 
the problem if incentives are not altered (Hilborn et al., 2005). But also the limits of this 
approach have been highlighted, depicting fishers as individuals maximising utility rather 
than firms maximising profits, investigating social behaviour and the role of institutions and 
transaction costs (Pascoe and Mardle 2005, Rettig, 1995, Ostrom, 1990).  
 
In the recent Norwegian context, Bjørndal and Gordon (2000) and Nøstbakken (2006) 
investigated the cost structure of the pelagic fleet for species like herring and capelin. 
Ekerhovd (2007) paid attention to the impact of regulations for herring on the unregulated 
blue whiting in the same fishery while Salvanes and Squires (1995) investigated the multi-
species technological properties of cod trawlers and Gordon et al. (2002) focussed on the 
efficiency of those. Sandberg (2006) and Hannesson (2006) researched the effect of the fish 
stock on economic performance of the Norwegian fleet and Jensen et al. (2004) looked into 
the effects between regulated and unregulated species in the purse seine fleet. For the coastal 
fleet, McWhinnie (2006) focused on its productivity. 
0.3 Problem statement 
This study shall focus on the coastal cod fishery. It is a peculiar fleet segment: some of the 
numerous vessels are more than seventy years of age while others are brand-new. They fish 
with traditional methods but modern gear. Their range of operation is small and particular 
species are only fished seasonally. Coastal vessels thus 'appear' to not fit into the modern fish 
industry which demands a steady flow of fish to optimally utilise the processing facilities 
(Stendal and Aarset, 2001, p.4). Seemingly a relic from other times, it is claimed by some to 
be a waste of resources: firstly because it consists of too many vessels and secondly because 
                                                 
2 And, by the way, the behaviour of the political authorities which in bio-economic models is implicitly 
benevolent, an assumption public choice theory would strongly reject. 
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large ocean going vessels supposedly can do the job cheaper. It is thus wondered whether 
their existence bases on regulations protecting them. But fishing along the coast of Norway 
also preserves a traditional lifestyle and gives the chance to choose it. And is bigger better 
anyway? Answering such questions requires knowledge. Interestingly, there is little academic 
attention paid to the coastal NEAC fishery in Norway in the literature. This is puzzling since 
it catches around seventy per cent of the total catch in Norway each year.  
 
Therefore, this study empirically investigates the technological structure of Norway’s coastal 
cod fishery from an economic point of view. Since the coastal fleet is not regulated uniformly, 
the study limits itself to the largest part: only vessels under 15 meters length are considered. 
These are regulated by so called maximum quotas. It is first asked whether neoclassical 
modelling is appropriate in the given context. Next, a partial-equilibrium neoclassical model 
will be developed. Since the vessels do not only fish cod but a multitude of species, a multi-
output framework is appropriate. Thirdly, the model will be estimated. In particular, the 
relationships between different outputs and inputs are to be described. It shall be answered 
whether it is legitimate to talk about a single composite input, 'fishing effort', as bio-economic 
models do. Also, it shall be revealed whether the harvesting processes for different species are 
independent or related. Is it possible to look at the NEAC fishery by itself? 
 
Subsequently the study is structured as follows: The first part discusses the reasonableness of 
the neoclassic assumptions that modelling departs from by means of a literature study. In 
particular, the prevalence of so called co-management challenges theory. In the second part, 
the theoretical model is derived and formalised. The third part contains the empirical model 
specification and the estimation. A discussion of the results concludes the thesis. 
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PART I – Justifying assumptions 
Is there in the context of the NEAC fishery a justification for employing the assumptions 
neoclassical models build upon? This shall be answered ahead of the actual modelling. Ideas 
from institutional, behavioural and evolutionary economics are used to challenge and support 
the unrealistic behavioural description. The applicability under the prevailing conditions in 
the NEAC fishery is then discussed. The intention is to get a clear impression of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the analysis undertaken.  
1.1 Homo oeconomicus 
Fishing is in an economic sense a production activity; hence the theory of the firm can be 
applied. The textbook neoclassical static modelling of production is basically based on the 
behavioural assumption that each firm optimises its selfish goal (Varian, 1992, p.23). Since a 
firm is an entity that grounds its existence on commercial activity, the standard 
operationalisation in the short run is economic profit. Firms are assumed to maximise their 
profits or minimise their costs. They orient themselves in an environment of markets, biology 
and regulations mainly on prices and quantities. If there is any initial uncertainty, the standard 
is to assume that they maximise expected profits: they are risk neutral. Over a somewhat 
longer time horizon it is common to look at a stream of profits and hence the value of the 
firm, referred to often as ‘net present value’3. It is such behaviour that in an environment of a 
common resource with open access provokes the unfolding of the tragedy of the common.   
1.2 Schools of thought and modelling 
While the neoclassical model captivates economists for its simplicity, its ability to 
approximate reality must not be neglected for that. Modelling means simplifying: facets of 
reality are left out. Assumptions about (sometimes unobserved) aspects are made, some of 
them termed 'heroic'. Friedman (1953) proposes that the best model is the simplest model 
predicting behaviour correctly. Neoclassical static optimisation models are such models that 
sometimes achieve this 'empirical justification'. They can be mathematically formalized and 
exposed to data, often fulfilling Popper's falsification demand on social research.  
                                                 
3 Real options theory includes a value for flexibility, deviating from the NPV paradigm (Slade, 1998). 
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However, the catch is that the model requires complete information on the structure of the 
market and the uncertainty, the cognitive ability to maximise, the lack of direct interaction 
(Rettig, 1995 p.433-4) and the absence of any other interests than in the own profits. Reality 
and numerous experiments have proven the model wrong on each of these accounts (Smith, 
1991). Friedman's (1953) instrumentalist proposition defending this kind of model is that it is 
sufficient to treat actor's “as if” they were rational and hence to not bother about the 
assumptions. Those would, in the process of simplification, become necessarily unrealistic. 
One is interested in the behaviour of the economy as a whole or parts of it and not the 
individual more than to that end.  
 
But even when looking at the explanatory power of the theory, the neoclassical modelling 
approach is not universally applicable as empirical evidence proves (Conlisk 1996, p.670). 
And even more important: the neoclassical predictions are achieved even without the 
restrictive informational and cognitive capacity assumptions (Smith, 1991, p.881). Based on 
this insight, Smith argued that the economic 'rationality' observed in markets does not stem 
from individual rationality but results from the interplay of individuals with the 'conditions' 
they face. Thus one needs an understanding of the 'actual' behaviour and these conditions.  
 
So how do individuals 'really' act then? Firstly, accepting that there are limits to information 
and cognitive abilities, 'rational' decisions in the neoclassical sense would not always be 
rational since there are possibly 'decision costs', subjective costs of solving the task of 
deciding. If an individual is in a familiar situation she possibly acts 'automatically' and has no 
such cost – in new environments she does and by accounting for those would be 'super-
rational'. Experiments showing that more 'rational' decisions are made in an unfamiliar 
environment when the stake (some monetary reward) is higher support the decision cost idea. 
Herbert Simon developed a framework called 'bounded rationality' that accounts for cognitive 
limits and the imperfect information (in: Conlisk, 1996 p.679).  
 
To understand an equilibrium outcome as the end of a learning process has proven fruitful in 
that context. Different economic learning concepts and models exist. Evolutionary economic 
theories assume no individual learning at all but only selection of those who perform best. On 
the other end of the continuum, the rational learning hypothesis by Lucas (1987) imposes the 
same rationality assumptions as the original neoclassical model and hence allows for no error 
in the learning process (in: Slembeck, 2000, p.2-3). But again the circumstances may play a 
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role in determining the applicability. Slembeck (2000, p.3-4) explained that when learning is 
prohibited no equilibrium may be reached or possibly more than one exists.  An important 
extension is therefore the so called “contingent learning”. The availability of information, the 
inter-dependence of actors, the complexity of the situation and the feedback which occurs 
throughout the learning process are conditions determining the existence of an equilibrium.  
 
In accordance with this view, Smith (1991 p.892) argues it is possible that an “institutional 
tradition encodes social learning” in a firm or sector. An individual may learn how to perform 
in a certain environment from other individuals or by the results he or she gets from some 
tactics. The person may be ‘doing his/her best’ but not being aware of that this is optimal for 
the firm. Hence it has to be established for the current context to what end it can be 
reasonably assumed that any learning process has been completed by non-homo oeconomicus 
fishermen with cognitive and informational limits. 
 
A second concern, raised by behavioural economists usually, is that some individuals are not 
solely selfish. That could, by means of cooperation, overcome the tragedy of the commons. 
Individuals care for others, how others behave, and what society thinks of them and react on 
social norms. Again, the circumstances can determine whether there is an ability to express 
that or whether selfishness is exhibited. Experiments identify the form of the market 
(competition), the ability to sanction non-compliance and the initial share of individuals 
adhering to a norm as factors influencing the chances of a cooperative outcome (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2002, Andreoni, 1988, Nyborg and Rege, 2003). So one also has to understand 
what the individual motivations are in the coastal fishery. And what conditions prevail as 
these presumably define how which individual behaviour translates into which economy-wide 
behaviour. 
 
Those repeatedly named circumstances are in economics categorized as institutions and 
transaction costs. The former category ranges from formal laws and regulations4 to social 
norms. The latter describe the cost of making an agreement (van der Burg, 2000, p.47). It does 
not only impact the ability to act strategically and foster selfish goals but also to what extent 
selfish or social concerns can be expressed.  
                                                 
4 Regulations and alike are typically included into the analysis in form of restrictions. But the point here is to 
find out how individual motivations are impacted by them, while the standard model does not allow for any 
other than selfish aims. 
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1.3 Applicability of neoclassic modelling to the NEAC fishery 
How does the NEAC fishery look like on those accounts? Is there evidence that ‘unfinished 
learning’ prohibits ‘best practice’? What accounts are there of individual motivations? What 
do the institutions look like and how do they impact behaviour? 
 
The coastal NEAC fishery exists for centuries already. The techniques of fishing are, despite 
introduction of modern equipment, well established in the coastal fishery. It is doubtful that 
some learning process concerning the harvesting behaviour is unfinished. Biological 
uncertainties are an integral part of the sector, so ex ante information on the outcome of the 
process is limited but nevertheless fishing is not a ‘random’ activity. Young fishermen 
recruited usually first work on boats of elder fishermen and learn from them. The feedback of 
the activity is direct, the harvest is obtained immediately which, all of which according to 
Slembeck (2000, p.7) would point at a finished learning process. So it is assumed from now 
on that equilibrium can be reached.  
 
This study is interested in coastal fishing as a commercial activity. So some kind of profit 
motive can hardly be doubted. Empirical evidence from other fisheries exists (Robinson and 
Pascoe, 1998 in: Pascoe and Mardle, 2005, p.2). But in addition to that, a survey by Feeny et 
al. (1996. p.189-91) among fishermen in Oregon, USA, found that fishing is a ‘lifestyle’ and 
fishermen appreciate being at sea and being independent. So such non-pecuniary rewards play 
a role and weaken the profit-motive5. Most importantly, they also mention evidence of 
altruistic motives. So cooperation may be expected to occur, if the institutional environment 
allows it. That no evidence for altruistic motives in the NEAC fishery is reported (at least 
none that the author of this study is aware of) is a minor concern. They are mainly used to 
explain cooperation, which in economics is generally impossible to justify with selfish aims. 
But cooperation and self-governance have in the past taken place along the Norwegian coast. 
So they were a fact. Are they an issue today? If so, neoclassical modelling is inappropriate. If 
not, it may be an approximation6.  
 
                                                 
5 The harvesting itself is presumably still undertaken in a ‘best practice’ (read: profit maximising) way. But 
fishermen would also stay in business if it would earn them more to work in an alternative occupation.  
6 The real puzzle is how to explain that it comes into being and takes place. Ostrom (1990) attempts to resolve 
it, as her subtitle “The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action” suggests. 
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In the old days, before the ability to harvest offshore, the only region to catch NEAC was the 
Northern Norwegian shore, mostly the Lofoten area. Here a self-governance scheme evolved. 
It was intended to resolve conflicts over fishing space (Holm et al. 2000, p.354). The sea was 
boiling with cod and the surface with fishermen. A community solution could be sought since 
(a) the spatial scale was such that fishermen could interact at low transaction cost, (b) locals 
could inhibit outsiders from entering the fishery and (c) they themselves participated in setting 
up the rules (Hilborn et al., 2005, p.47-8, Holm et al., 2000, p.354-5)7. 
 
With the advent of new and more efficient technologies, the spatial scale over which 
cooperation was needed changed. A community based solution could not be sought – it was 
not a community problem any longer. Government assumed responsibility and a solution to 
both the Norwegian conflict between trawlers and coastal fishermen and between Norway and 
Russia was found. As such, it can be imagined that this could complement the local co-
management solution described above. However, by that time also the nature of the problem 
had changed. Now it was not a conflict for fishing space but the resource itself started to 
become stressed and scarce. Regulations were amended and weakened the local involvement 
of fishermen (Holm et al., 2000, p.358-60). Following Ostrom (1990, p.7-15), the modern 
regulations can be thought of as based on the ‘tragedy of the commons’ model used it in a 
metaphorical sense. Presuming selfishly optimising fishermen, government assumes ultimate 
responsibility. The regulatory changes possibly turned out as a self fulfilling prophecy: by 
treating fishermen as selfish optimisers, they turned into them.  
 
Summarised, it appears not unreasonable to think of the coastal fishermen as profit 
maximisers: they know how to do what they do the best way and they presumably have, 
amongst others, a strong profit motive. The technical possibilities and the migratory patterns 
of the cod make a solely community based solution in general infeasible, but the government 
could set the framework such that is was possible. However, it apparently did not and instead 
designed regulations based on the behavioural presumption that fishermen act selfishly that 
could turn out true. Of course such loose argumentation should be handled with care and, 
while the continuation of the study will assume that the neoclassical behavioural assumptions 
hold, the preceding discussion shall remind of the sandy grounds it stands on: cooperative 
behaviour of fishermen would render a neoclassical model invalid. 
                                                 
7 To repeat, that such institutional arrangements work can only be explained taking into account a concern for 
fairness or reciprocity such that an individual is willed to incur the cost of punishing a 'free rider'. 
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PART II – Theoretical model 
After cautiously elaborating that rational economic behaviour, despite being a non-existent 
artefact, may be a good approximation in the case of the coastal NEAC fishery, the 
consecutive step is to look closer at the model’s abilities. What this study in neoclassical 
terms deals with is optimisation of a regulated multi-output production process in a stochastic 
biological environment. Introductory it is outlined which aspects of the fishermen’s’ 
behaviour can be captured by a neoclassic model. Next the ‘economic’ environment, namely 
the regulations, the technology, the resource itself and the markets are looked at next. After 
that the formalisation is undertaken. The concept of a multi-output short run restricted profit 
function is introduced. A section on the concept of duality, which allows economists to 
analyse technology without knowing anything about it, is followed by how the analysis can be 
greatly simplified: if either aggregation is possibly or independence of species declared. 
Finally the issues of aggregation over individuals and assignment of costs to specific outputs 
are touched upon shortly. 
2.1 The dos and don’ts of neoclassical models 
What can a neoclassical model account for and what not? As indicated above (section 1.2.), 
cooperation is excluded from the model since it is difficult to explain assuming selfish aims. 
Also strategic behaviour is not modelled. This will be justified below as usual: fishermen have 
no market power, hence no chance to act strategically in a standard economic sense. Thirdly, 
the actors do not influence their environment. Political and market institutions are modelled as 
static and external and not evolving. So while fishermen do act as ‘political actors’, trying to 
influence the political decision process or the market through interest groups (e.g. Norges 
Råfisklag), these activities are not part of the static neoclassical model.  
 
What is left so far is the intrinsic activity: fishing. There are dynamic dimensions to it: the 
choice of location, the number of trips, when to fish and to shift gear type. For instance, the 
regional availability of cod some particular year is uncertain at the beginning of the season 
and but knowledge is likely to increase throughout the season. A good fishing spot can then 
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be used again, a worse avoided. Those dynamics cannot be modelled this way8. Neither 
captured are dynamic long run investment decisions. The specialised physical fishing capital 
faces an imperfect market, making it rigid. One needs a specific permit to be allowed to fish 
and the vessel length and capacity may not be changed without permission (see section 2.2). 
More generally, fishing boats as highly specialised capital, unlikely to be sold when prospects 
are good and needing time to be build, and unlikely to be bought when times are bad, at least 
not at the value it has to the fisher. It is not possible to capture this in static analysis and the 
concerned variables must be regarded as fixed. 
 
So what is left now? Model-fishermen that react on incentives provided by their environment 
and statically optimise accordingly. Obeying (or not) the regulations and adapting to biology, 
they react on price incentives provided by the market. The available fishing technology limits 
what is technically possible. Theory is defined in terms of prices and quantities of different 
inputs as well as different species caught, some fish stocks and the regulatory framework. 
What analysis does that permit? The use of inputs and choice of species in reaction to 
variation in prices of either two, changes in regulations or biological determinants.  
2.2 Regulatory framework for the coastal NEAC fleet 
Next the study turns to a description of the environment coastal NEAC fishermen face and 
firstly the Norwegian regulations. Their origin is a set of politically stated goals which are 
introduced beforhand9. The review of the regulations is followed by a neoclassical evaluation.  
2.2.1 The politically stated goals of Norwegian fishery policy  
The coastal waters and its resources are by law state owned property10. It is the political 
(hence in a neoclassical sense: society's) intentions that are meant to determine who fishes 
how to what extent. The Norwegian government states with respect to the NEAC fishery that 
it wants to (i) secure the fish stock as a common property, that it wishes to have a (ii) modern, 
profitable and (iii) varied fleet and that this fleet shall (iv) promote activity along the whole 
                                                 
8 Squires (1987b, p.559) argued that dynamic models for fishermen decisions have several limitations, of 
which some may have been overcome today (a review is found in Charles, 2007).  
9 Political goals are not immutable but themselves outcome of behaviour. While in this study these are 
assumed to be benevolent, public choice theory would suggest that they are the result of interest group 
influences and political actors responding to those as to optimise own selfish goals.  
10 Fishermen may have a quite different opinion on that. While fisheries are centuries old, resource 
management is a recent concern and hence fishermen may reject the property rights implied and view the fish 
as rightfully theirs. 
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coastline (NOU, 2006, p.76). Of those aims some are aligned but some can also contradict 
each other. The most debated conflict appears to be between (i) versus (iii) and (iv). Large 
vessels fish presumably more profitable with less labour required (Sandberg et al., 1998, p. 
262). Standard efficiency economics point at that there is too much of society's resources 
devoted to fishing, termed overcapacity (Hannesson, 2001). But possibly human well-being 
and hence a society's welfare are not captured adequately by ‘welfare’. As Sen (1999, in: Hart 
and Reynolds, 2002, p.6) argues, the “freedom of choice” of individuals should be regarded. 
Fishermen value their lifestyle. If large vessels are welfare optimal relatively, also a varied 
fleet is wasteful. But biological considerations (the age structure of the stock and the 
selectivity of the techniques) may cast doubt on this. Fishing exclusively with selectivity 
pattern of larger vessels could be economically harmful (Armstrong and Sumalia, 2001)11.  
2.2.2 International agreements 
Migration patterns of many fish stocks are not confined to one country's sea territory. 
Conflicts over fishery resources have led to the development of an UN administered 
framework with the 1982 'Law of the sea convention' at its core. Norway signed the 
agreement in 1994. It establishes exclusive economic zones (200 nautical miles ashore a 
country's coastline), demands sustainable fishing and efficient utilisation of resources as well 
as cooperative behaviour by states for the management of migratory species. The ‘UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement' from 1995 supplements the convention by demanding precautionary 
behaviour and cooperation in international waters (FAO, 2007b). 
2.2.3 Participation 
How is access to a fishery actually organised? To be allowed to fish a concession is required. 
That implies the possibility of limits to entry. These limits were introduced in the largest part 
of the coastal fleet in 1990 as a response on the critical condition of the NEAC stock. The 
relevant law (in Norwegian: “deltakerloven”) is unspecific in determining who is allowed to 
fish. The regulator has the discretion to differentiate by fished species, vessel size, technology 
employed etc. But any regulation is only valid for one year, then it has to be evaluated and 
formulated anew (FD, 2007a). 
                                                 
11 Further related issues are the sensitivity to changes in the economic environment, the value of potential 
innovation or knowledge loss and alike. 
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2.2.4 Total allowable catch (TAC) 
The NEAC migrates mostly between Norwegian and Russian territory, with some 'loophole' 
which is international. The Norwegian and the Russian government each year bilaterally in 
the 'Joint Norwegian Russian Fisheries Commission' decide on a TAC for cod. They receive 
biological advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and 
employ a management rule: The overall fishing mortality shall be kept stable over periods of 
three years while the TAC shall not vary by more than ten per cent. In recent years 
continuously about 45 per cent are allocated to each country while the remaining 10 per cent 
are distributed among third countries. When the national TAC is caught, the fishery is closed. 
The quota often exceeds the recommendation and due to non-compliance the actual catch the 
quota (Fisheries.no, 2006a). 
2.2.5 The 'trawl ladder'  
In Norway the TAC in a first step is further divided between the two main fleet segments, 
trawl and coastal, according to the so called 'trawl ladder'. Depending on the size of the TAC 
it determines how much is fished by the each group. The current version, in place since 1995, 
prescribes that when the Norwegian TAC is 'low' (< 130.000 tons), the coastal fleet receives a 
relatively larger share (72 per cent) than when it is 'high' (> 330.000 tons, 67 per cent). For the 
intermediate range the coastal share descends linearly (Armstrong 1998 p.122-3). A closely 
related measure is the so called '12 mile zone' that bans trawl fishing close to the coast (Holm 
et al., 2000, p.357).   
2.2.6 Group quotas…  
The coastal vessels are since 1990 divided into an 'open' group, a 'closed' group (called Group 
II and Group I respectively) and a group of conventional vessels above 28 meters length 
(which is also ‘closed’). 'Closed' means there are strict requirements to participate and only 
under special circumstances new participants are permitted, while 'open' indicates that only 
very general requirements need to be fulfilled to be granted a permit. The division was meant 
to divide vessels that fish on cod as main species and those that have it as a secondary species 
or catch it as bycatch. The largest share (roughly 90 per cent of the Norwegian TAC) of the 
fishery is closed; the rest is, in principle, open. Activity demands were in place in some years 
in order for the vessel to be allowed to fish in the closed group the following year as well 
(St.Meld. 20, 2003, p.24-9).  
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2.2.7 … and the 'Finnmark-model'  
Within the groups a further differentiation of the group-TAC is made by the size. Since 2002 
this is in the closed group organised by the so called 'Finnmarksmodellen' (the 'Finnmark-
model') which divides the group into four length segments. The length relevant for any of 
these further divisions is not the actual length but the length at a certain date (in Norwegian: 
‘skæringslengde’ and ‘skæringsdato’) (St.Meld. 20, 2003, p.30). Increasing capacity by length 
extension in general requires permission by the authorities (Årland and Bjørndal, 2002). 
However, since the introduction of the various length differentiations this date has been 
moved for different classes at different times. This was announced in advance. Hence the 
composition of the groups has changed.  
2.2.8 Collective quota for cod, haddock and saithe.  
Despite the 'torskefokus', multiple species are caught. Among those, haddock and saithe are 
economically most important (see section 3.1.3). Until 2002 there were no limits to participate 
in the haddock and saithe fisheries in the Barents Sea. Then the vessels in Group I under 15 
meters length were extended to include these species. New vessels hence entered the different 
length classes. A collective quota (in Norwegian: “samlekvote”) and an 'exchange rate' for the 
three species was established. Certain limits on how much of that quota may be used on 
fishing cod for each vessel were formulated12 (FKD, 2002). 
2.2.9 Individual quotas: vessel and maximum  
Finally, the group quotas are divided among boats. Each vessel receives an individual quota 
depending on its 'official' length. The open group has since its establishment been managed by 
so called maximum quotas (MQs): a 'mark-up' is added to the group quota and based on this 
inflated quota the individual shares are determined. The fishery is closed when the actual 
group quota is reached, disregarding what each single fisherman has caught. Group I vessels, 
which catch the major share of the Norwegian TAC, have been managed by maximum quotas 
from 1990 to 2003. From 2004 onwards vessels in that group above 15 meters length received 
IVQs. That is, each vessel is permitted to catch a certain share of the group quota. The same is 
true for the conventional vessels with a length of over 28 meters (St.Meld. 20, 2003, p. 28, 
FKD, 2001 – 2006). In addition, according to Årland and Bjørndal (2002, p.311), “for smaller 
                                                 
12 Despite the principle being politically reconfirmed, in 2007 the collective quota was temporarily suspended 
and individual quotas reintroduced. The officially given reason was the low TAC for all species.  
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vessels in the coastal fleet a certain percentage of the maximum quota may be guaranteed. In 
that case, the guaranteed quantity may be harvested also after closure of the fishery.” 
2.2.10 Transferability measures  
The above described regulatory system is highly inflexible. Policies to promote flexibility are 
subsumed under the term 'transferability measures'. Transferability refers today to quotas. In 
the coastal fishery, three regulations of that type exist: condemnation policy (in Norwegian: 
“kondemneringsordning”), structural policy (“strukturordning”) and operation policy 
(“driftsordning”) (NOU, 2006, p.35-6).  
Condemnation policy  
An earlier condemnation scheme starting in the 1960s intended to subsidise fleet renewal. It 
based on the perception of an outdated fleet, leading to massive capacity expansions (NOU, 
2006, p.34; Standal and Aarset, 2001). In 2003 the government introduced a new scheme 
under which Group I vessels under 15 meter length taken out of the fishery receive 
compensation from the government. The quota that is set free is divided between fishermen in 
the length group the vessel belonged to (NOU, 2006, p.35).  
Structural policy 
In 2004 the ‘structural policy’ was implemented for the Group I coastal fleet between 15 and 
28 meters. It allowed the transfer the quota within the same municipality and length category 
according to the Finnmark-model to one or more other vessels, given the selling vessel was 
taken out of the fishery. The quota was reduced by 20 per cent and an active vessel could not 
hold more than three quotas in total. No boundary was placed on the duration of the transfer 
but the structural quota had to be reconfirmed each year anew by the regulator. With a 
government change the structural quota policy was discontinued in 2005 and an expert group 
(“Strukturutvalget”) was appointed to evaluate it. The results have been published but at the 
time of writing are not yet reflected in policy (NOU, 2006, p.35).  
  
Operation policy 
This final flexibility measure was introduced in the northern parts of the closed coastal fleet in 
2003 and extended to include the whole coastal fleet in 2004. It permits to exchange quotas 
between vessels temporarily for one year at a time. The respective vessel had to give away the 
full quota and was not permitted to participate in the open part of the fishery. Out of five years 
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the quota can at most be given away for three years and only two years in a row. Again, 
quotas can only be exchanged among vessels in the same length category, within the same 
municipality and a vessel may fish three times the single quota at maximum. One intention 
was to account for regional variability in the availability of cod (NOU, 2006, p.36, 74).  
2.2.11 Qualitative measures 
Qualitative measures are those that take account of the population dynamics of the NEAC 
stock and its size and age structure. They are aimed at protecting juvenile fish. A minimum 
catch size of 47 cm is required. Also, a minimum mesh sizes for fishing with nets is 
prescribed. It is forbidden to discard too small fish or bycatch. Areas where catches contain 15 
per cent or more of too small fish are temporarily closed. In addition there are permanently 
closed areas and in some years a certain part of the quota had to be fished after some 
predetermined date (NOU, 2005, p.151-60; Fisheries.no, 2007).  
2.2.12 Lofoten co-management regulations 
As discussed in section 1.3, the Lofoten fishery is partly based on co-management intended to 
resolve conflicts over 'fishing space'. Introduced as the ‘Lofoten Law’ in 1897 and later on 
subsumed under the ‘Salt Water Fishing Act’ (1983) and amended since, it prescribes that 
fishermen should to a certain extent themselves determine who is to fish where in the Lofoten 
area (Holm et al, 2000 p.354, 358-9; FD, 2007b). 
2.2.13 Compliance measures  
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) is a major source of concern in the 
international NEAC fishery. It can basically result in the same fishing behaviour as under 
open access and threaten to extinct the stock. The three organisations involved in enforcing 
the regulations are the Directorate of Fisheries (FD), the Norwegian Coast Guard and the 
fishermen's sales organisations. At sea, controls are performed regularly by the Coast Guard. 
At land, all catch, even bycatch and catch not permitted (for example because it is juvenile or 
the quota is fulfilled) has to be registered. This is performed by the sales organisations. In 
addition, the directorate also regularly controls fishing firms as well as firms further down the 
value chain to 'double check'. There exist numerous penalties, like withdraw of the licence 
and the illegal catch or fines (Fisheries.no, 2006b; Pedersen, 2006). 
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2.2.14 Neoclassic modelling of regulations  
What are the implications of the regulatory regime for neoclassic modelling? What are the 
incentives provided? Many measures and their predicted effects are well established in 
economic theory (following Perman et al., 2003; Rettig, 1995; Årland and Bjørndal, 2002): 
 
Firstly, restricting some 'input' (e.g. vessel length) is said to lead to substitution away from 
that input (if technologically possible) and hence cost inefficiency. It requires to model the 
quantity as fixed. This may have effects on usage of other inputs and choice of outputs. 
 
The intention of a TAC is to prevent the biological overfishing (Rettig, 1995. p.440). 
Accordingly the management rule is not derived from bio-economic optimal resource 
management but based on protection of the resource base and political considerations. The 
fishermen’s incentives to maximise profits are unaffected. The fisher faces most likely a 
higher stock but the possible rent is said to be again fully diluted: either new fishermen enter 
the fishery or existing fishermen extend effort, unless inhibited by the technical possibilities 
or other regulations. Due to the closure of the season behaviour could change character; a true 
'derby fishery' could develop. The most prominent example in the literature is the Pacific 
halibut fishery where a TAC shortened the fishing season to some 48 hours and led to even 
more severe overcapacity as well as a breakdown of the fresh fish market (Asche et al., 2005, 
p.iv, 2, 5) The 'as much as soon as possible' incentive took the form of investments in vessels 
capable catching a year's catch on one fishing trip. Not biology and technology but the 
regulator terminates the fishing. If the technical possibility to catch more exists and it is 
economically beneficial to do so, another result of a TAC is that an incentive to not comply 
and catch more than allowed is introduced. Despite these qualitative changes, static 
neoclassical models are not changed by the introduction of a TAC. 
 
Regulating participation in general can be viewed as the government claiming the resource. 
Limited entry means that effort cannot be expanded by more fishermen participating. But 
effort will according to standard theory be extended along other dimensions, if possible, until 
rent is dissipated. Secondly, indirect effects could occur through other markets. If for example 
access to a restricted fishery is a liability, then capital may become cheaper and change the 
relative price of inputs (Townsend, 1985, p.195)13. Reserving quota for specific groups by the 
                                                 
13 In another modelling approach, limited entry may open up for cooperation and co-management, see part I. 
  
19 
'trawl ladder', group quotas or the ‘Finmark-model’ possibly inhibits more efficient groups or 
segments from increasing their share by extending effort. Over time, in each group it is again 
expected that rents are eroded by expansion. The political reason for the 'trawl ladder' is that 
trawlers have more alternative species to catch, due to their larger range of operation and the 
higher diversity of species in their area of operation (Armstrong, 1998, p.122-3). However, 
from an economic efficiency point of view, the pattern has been shown to be contrary to the 
optimum (Armstrong and Sumalia, 2001). 
 
IVQs secure a certain catch (share) per annum to the fisher or, put differently, limit him to 
that. The quantity caught is not a choice for the fisher any longer, given it is not larger than 
optimal. In the short run, he optimises by minimising the costs. There is no need to race to the 
fish, the season can be planned. This is in neoclassic theory the only device besides taxes that 
changes behaviour elementary. Externalities are internalised and short run cost efficiency is 
achieved (Perman et al., 2003, p.587-90). It allows for resource rent in the short run. Årland 
and Bjørndal (2002, p.312) point at the importance of the demand side for the optimising 
behaviour. If prices vary seasonally due to variations in quality or consumer behaviour, the 
fishermen are likely to account for those price fluctuations and not only fish to minimise costs 
but maximise profits. This cannot be modelled with the current means.  
 
MQs on the other hand are no entitlement and only add an additional limitation on fishing. If 
the individual fisherman correctly expects to catch the quota before the season is closed, it is 
binding. Neoclassical theory then suggests that he tries to catch the MQ at minimal cost. If 
small boats are guaranteed a certain minimum catch, another possibility is that it is more 
beneficial to only catch this amount instead of attempting to catch more. But if the fisher does 
not expect to fulfil the MQ, it is still optimal to maximise profits by catching the highest 
possible share. Hence some neoclassical model-fishermen may maximise profits while others 
minimise cost. Ex post one crude model assumption would be that those catching their full 
MQ have been cost minimising, while the others maximised profits. This neglects the 
uncertainty about the availability of fish and the closing date of the fishery. The information 
on both increases throughout the fishing season, and neoclassical fishermen could actually 
change behaviour. The degree of competition for fish may also depend on how large the 
degree of overregulation is (Årland and Bjørndal, 2002, p.312). Due to data limitations the 
above suggested separation is not undertaken in this study. Instead it assumes that fishermen 
maximise profits, contrary to earlier studies (Nøstbakken, 2006, Bjørndal and Gordon, 2000). 
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That may be defended by giving more weight to the uncertainty in the fishery. Either way, 
studies on MQ regulated fisheries are vulnerable to wrong behavioural assumptions. 
 
Species interact, biologically as well as economically. Not taking either into account can have 
undesirable consequences. If cod regulation leads to free capacities (mainly time) for 
fishermen, they might increase pressure on unregulated substitutes. If on the other hand cod 
and some other species are caught in the very same process, regulating cod may decrease the 
catches of the other species unintentionally (Jensen, 2000, p.7-8). Regulating cod, haddock 
and saithe together intends to incorporate the economic interaction. Most vessels fish all three 
species. If they were perfect complements, the exchange rate should reflect the ratio at which 
the species are found together. If they were substitutes, it had to price the trade-off for the 
fishermen precisely. If they are independent, the regulation is not sensible as each fishery 
could be efficiently managed by itself. In addition the measure may provide flexibility in the 
light of the uncertainty of fishing (a fisher may not know which species he finds on a trip).  
 
Both condemnation and structural policy attempt to lessen the incentives for effort expansion 
described earlier. They create an opportunity cost making disinvestment more attractive. In a 
heterogeneous fleet the least efficient vessels are expected to leave the fishery. But, 
strategically, it may involve some first mover disadvantage: with every vessel removed, the 
prospects of the limited entry fishery improve. However, long run decisions are as mentioned 
(section 2.1) not considered further in this study. The operation policy on the contrary allows 
for temporary quota exchange, possibly accounting for uncertain regional availabilities. They 
create a rather imperfect market (since the total quota needs to be exchanged before the 
fishing season). By that, efficiency gains should be possible. If the bought quota is a MQ there 
is no entitlement and the fisher must expect to catch more than the worth of the extra quota. 
To model the purchase decision is beyond the scope here. A shortcut suggested by Asche et 
al. (2005, p.4) is to view the purchasing and the harvesting decisions sequentially.  
 
Finally, neoclassical economics has developed a theory where the incentives to cheat are 
created by the asymmetric information (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). Whether a fisher 
decides to fish or discard illegally is based on the possible gain, the likelihood that he is 
detected, the possible penalty and other costs of secrecy or ‘moral’ character. Also the initial 
position may matter. Additional income in a situation with relatively high income could be 
valued less, which can be viewed as increasing risk aversion. Since illegal landings seem 
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rather difficult along the Norwegian coast, the theory would suggest that it is not the case. But 
since there is no continuous on board control, discards are hardly observable. Årland and 
Bjørndal (2002, p.313) commented that compliance in Norway appears to be good, contrary 
to Vassdal and Hermansson (2003, p.30) who expected discarding. Jensen and Aarset (2004) 
investigated in a survey motives for non-compliance in the coastal NEAC fleet, indicating that 
it prevails14. Sandberg (2006, p.1015) empirically found an indication that low TAC might 
provoke discarding behaviour. This study simplifies and disregards the issue. 
2.3 The first hand market  
After presenting the extensive regulatory framework, the study continues the review of the 
economically relevant environment and now turns to the markets. The first time caught fish is 
exchanged between the fisher and a buyer who intends to process and possibly export it. This 
is the so called 'first hand market'. Standard theory presumes that the economic individuals are 
atomistic actors in an unregulated market. They react on prices, which are the outcome of the 
invisible hand at work, when aggregated supply and demand meet. Is this description 
accurate? No. As already known, the total supply is fixed by the TAC, hence given it is 
binding, supply is in theory perfectly inelastic. Demand is derived from the consumer demand 
in the final markets where the consumption products are purchased (Asche et al., 2001). The 
first hand market itself has been strongly regulated since the early 1930s. Despite more recent 
deregulations, the structure is not accurately reflected by a stylized ‘free market’ (Holm, 
1995). Six regional sales organisations each season negotiate with the buyer's national 
organisation on minimum prices for most commercial fish species. If no agreement is reached, 
the ‘Raw Fish Act’ permits the sales organisations to set the minimum price by themselves15.  
Different ways in which the fishermen and the processors and exporters can meet within this 
framework exist, mainly electronic auctions or direct contracts (Norges Råfisklag, 2007).  
 
How about modelling the individuals then? Can one from an individual perspective anyway 
summarize the outcome in one exogenous price parameter? The individual fishermen could be 
assigned two roles: one as a 'political' actor influencing the market regulations such as the 
minimum prices through the sales organisation and one as an economic actor that by 
harvesting optimises his short run goals. In the largest sales organisation alone there are 4.800 
                                                 
14 Unfortunately it is not clear what non-compliance in the study is: discarding or illegal landings.  
15 This institutional structure was initially the result of power imbalances in favour of the demand side in an 
economically and biologically highly variable environment (Holm, 1995). 
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fishing vessels represented whose owners meet about 215 buyers (Norges Råfisklag, 2007). 
That should suffice for assuming external prices. Hence while the 'political' activity is not 
modelled, the standard modelling of harvesting seems not to be impeded16.  
2.4 Biology in production theory 
Next the study proceeds to the source of economic activity: the resource itself. What features 
of the stocks are relevant to the coastal fisher? Firstly the relative abundance of fish, the stock 
sizes and compositions. Stocks are not homogeneous but consist of individuals of different 
size and age with larger fish yielding higher prices. Secondly, the geographical distribution 
matters. Where is the fish located in the coastal waters? Thirdly, the migration pattern or 
seasonality determines when the fish is available. As discussed in section 2.1, seasonality as 
well as locational choice are not modelled. So the only aspects focussed on are the availability 
of cod and other species of relevant size. Since the species come to the coast to spawn (EFF 
Norsk Sjømat, 2006), it is assumed that the so called spawning stock biomass is the relevant 
parameter. The stocks are external to the fishermen. It has been argued that they therefore 
should be modelled much the same as technological change (Asche et al., 2005, p.23). Typical 
bio-economic models assume a homogeneous stock and a negative proportional stock effect. 
The cost of fishing increases ceteris paribus in the same proportion as the stock decreases 
(Sandberg, 2006, p.1007). However, empirical evidence suggests that the effect is much less 
than proportional (Sandberg, 2006, p.1012; Hannesson, 2006 p.7-8). Stocks are not, as 
implicitly assumed, evenly located over the ocean. Instead stocks consist of subpopulations 
with a patchy distribution or have migratory patterns so that their whereabouts are known at 
least to some extent. Good fishing spots are searched and water is not screened randomly 
(Hannesson, 2006, p.9). In multi-species fisheries, one species' stock may have impact on 
costs of harvesting another, so all stocks should be considered. For example, a collapse in one 
species may cause fishermen to redirect effort to other species. 
2.5 Techniques and technology  
Besides the markets, the political and the ecosystem, the fishermen also operate in a world in 
which at some point in time only certain 'ways' to harvest fish exist. In capture fisheries a 
fishing vessels with gear, some labour force and other equipment cruises the ocean. A short 
impression of the fishing techniques in the coastal NEAC fisheries shall be given. Four gear 
                                                 
16 Nothing has been said on input markets. It is assumed that fishermen are price takers. 
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types are mainly employed: (1) longlines are put out at the fishing spot with weights attached 
so that they reach the appropriate depth. They are equipped with hooks loaded with bait. After 
a day or two the fish is hauled in. (2) Gillnets are nets that are either stationary or floating and 
entangle moving fish. (3) Purse seine works by sieving the water: Some net is laid out in a 
large circle and closed. Initially the fish are guided by the nets and at the end closed in from 
all sides. (4) Hand-jig finally consists of drawing a line with hooks through the water and 
attracting the fish by the motion (Karlsen et al., 2001, p. 108 - 115). These different gears all 
select species and sizes in a certain way. For example, gillnets have a mesh size that allows 
small fish to swim through while large fish may be too big to get entangled. Considering the 
species, all species are caught that are found at the location where the net is placed. This is 
referred to as the selectivity of the gear (Millar and Fryer, 1999). It determines together with 
the availability of fish the composition the catch. 
 
Economists talk a great deal about technology without meaning technique. Technology in an 
economic sense is often defined as the relationship between quantities of inputs used and 
some quantity of outputs produced17. What they are interested in is how the assumed profit 
motive interacts with the technology available. That is to at least some extent private 
information to the fisher. And even if it is disclosed 'how' the fish is harvested, this will 
possibly be 'in a fisherman's' not in an economic sense18. Hence it is recommendable to look 
at actual outcomes to learn about the economic aspects of technology.  
 
Commonly one looks at the reaction of in- and outputs to changes in prices or regulations and 
classifies them as substitutes or complements. Does a fisher substitute fuel for labour? Are 
two species caught at the same fishing spot or does the fisher divert time from catching one 
species to target another? One also looks at the effect of an increase of the scale of operation: 
do profits per unit in- or decrease when producing more or less of one or all inputs? Closely 
linked is the question whether boats or the whole fleet operate at a cost or even welfare 
efficient level: would it be advantageous to fish more or less per boat, to have larger boats or a 
smaller fleet. Next one can ask whether it is beneficial to fish many species or to specialize in 
one. Is the harvesting of different fish independent or joint (Jensen, 2002, p. 2, 22-3; Squires, 
1987b, p.561-2)? Those questions are at the core of this thesis.  
                                                 
17 A peculation is that there are no qualities defined. However, quality of cod differs with its size; larger cod 
receives a price premium. That will empirically be captured indirectly (section 3.1.3). 
18 In line with sections 1.2 and 1.3: fishermen do something the 'best way' to do it, as they were taught or 
learned by trial and error. That does not require awareness of the economic properties of the technology.  
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2.6 Neoclassic formalisation  
In section (2.1) the capabilities of static fishery models were indicated, followed by an 
overview over economic environment (model-) fishermen operate in. Now, the behavioural 
assumption (section 1.) and the environment (section 2.2-2.5) are formalised and the 
properties of the representation discussed.  
2.6.1 The restricted profit function   
So how do neoclassical economists go about to formalise the problem? It is typically 
formulated as a constrained static optimisation problem of the Kuhn-Tucker type with the 
environment as constraints. The most general functional concept meant to depict the outcome 
is the restricted profit function, mapping the maximum level of profit attainable for given 
prices. It is referred to as restricted since some inputs and/or outputs are not a choice of the 
individual19. Analytically, the more common profit, cost and revenue functions are special 
cases of the restricted profit function (McFadden, 1978, p.4). The appropriately specified 
function exhaustively describes the assumptions and captures all the economic effects of 
technology, regulation and biological environment (Chambers, 1988, p.170). 
 
Much is not known about fish behaviour, to neither scientists nor fishermen. How to deal with 
this and other (economic or political) uncertainties? Standard treatment is to let firms form 
expectations about the uncertain elements. It is assumed that those are correct in the sense that 
the firm knows 'something', namely the probability distribution over the unknown factors. In 
addition the firm needs to have some preferences over certainty. Usual is to let firms be risk 
neutral and maximise expected profits – which comes down to the same optimality conditions 
as in the certain case (Hoel and Moene, 1993, p.161-7). Squires (1987b, p.564) circumvented 
expectation operators by assuming that ex ante formed expectations are (on average) realised 
ex post. This leads to the following formalisation (Chambers, 1988, p.277-9): 
  
 z:  netput vector, input vector x for all zi <0, output vector y for all  zi >0  
T:  production possibilities set (fulfilling regularity assumptions required)  
θ: netput vector of fixed in- and outputs, (x1, y1) 
q: price vector, with subvectors (p0, p1) representing out- and (w0, w1) input prices 
s: vector of fish stocks 
                                                 
19 Formally the division into in- and outputs is obsolete. They can be viewed as “netputs”, negative for in- and 
positive for outputs (McFadden, 1978, p.61). To keep the intuition, this study uses the terms in- and output.  
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It is assumed that restrictions modelled bind. A restriction not not being in force is here not of 
interest. The model is based on observations and partly can let the data decide which 
restrictions are binding, partly can that be tested ex post. No attempts to afterwards simulate 
situations where the restrictions may change character are made. Certain properties of (I) can 
be deducted solely from the optimisation assumption:  
 
(i) All profit functions are homogeneous of degree one in prices (Varian, 1992, p.41), stating 
rather trivially (considering the economic content) that in case of inflation no behavioural 
adjustments make the firm better off. (ii) Secondly, any profit function is also non-decreasing 
in output prices and non-increasing in input prices (monotonic) (Varian, 1992, p.41). If an 
input price rise increases profits, the initial production plan was hardly optimal. (iii) Thirdly, 
it is convex in output prices and concave in input prices of unrestricted in- and outputs. If an 
output price increases a firm gains already by changing nothing. But it most likely can 
increase profits even more (e.g. producing an additional unit became profitable). If an input 
price rises, substitution possibly dampens the decrease in profits (Varian, 1992, p.41)20. Usual 
profit functions are required to be non-negative. This is not the case due to the restrictions 
(Moschini, 1988, in: Ekerhovd, 2007, p.4) and the stochastic nature of the resource. Stock 
fluctuations may provoke short time losses. But in the long run it may be profitable to stay in 
the fishery and incur them. (iv) A restricted profit function furthermore is concave in the 
restricted outputs and convex in the restricted inputs (Bergman, 1997, p.250). The economic 
argument mirrors the shape requirements with respect to prices.  
 
Hotelling's Lemma applies: The derivative by the price of an unrestricted input gives the 
factor demand function, valid for the fixed netput levels. Similarly supply functions are 
gained (Varian, 1992, p.43-4, McFadden, 1978, p.74-5). A marginal price change has two 
effects: a direct one, changing profits through the change in price, and an indirect one, 
through the behavioural adjustments. At the optimum however infinitesimal changes do not 
cause behavioural adjustment. What remains is the direct effect, which is nothing else but the 
contribution of the factor or output to profits (Varian, 1992, p.45). 
                                                 
20 A mathematical property (with no economic content)  necessary for analytical treatment is continuity.  
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For species regulated by a TAC, industry supply is determined externally. The individual 
supply functions are conditioned on that regulation and cannot translate into an industry 
response directly. For restricted or otherwise fixed in- and outputs (e.g. stocks) the derivative 
yields inverse demand or supply functions (Kohli, 1993, p. 247-8). They depict what an 
additional unit would be worth in terms of profit: the shadow price (Squires, 1987b, p.560).  
 
Demand and supply inherit properties (i)-(iii) Convexity as a property of second derivatives 
implies that the matrix of first derivatives of demand and supply needs to be symmetric and 
positive semi-definite (input prices expressed as negative numbers). The latter says demand 
does not increase and supply does not decrease in its own price. Symmetry requires that the 
response of one netput, say A, on changes of another, B, is the same as the reaction of B on 
changes in A21 (Varian, 1992, p. 32-5, 46).  
2.6.2 Analytical concepts capturing the relevant aspects 
It is of particular interest to this study particularly technology shape the fishermen's optimal 
behaviour. Now that the functional concepts have been introduced, how are the different 
effects contained in those?  
 
Firstly, as stated above, the shadow price is22 (Squires, 1987b, p.560): 
(III)  θ
πλ ∂
∂=  
How demand and supply react on price changes is answered by own-price and cross-price 
elasticities, the percentage response of a factor or species on a one per cent change in some 
price. Substitutability and complementarity are technological properties but what individuals 
react on is prices. So price elasticities are from an economic viewpoint intuitively more 
compelling than technological concepts (Chambers, 1988, p.65, 95): 
                                                 
21 Varian (1992, p.34): “There is no obvious reason ...but it is implied by the model...”. From the perspective of 
this studies that points at a weakness of the formal model. In Marshall’s words (in Weintraub, 1997, p.2043): 
“(1) Use mathematics as a short hand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. (2) Keep to them till you 
have done. (3) Translate into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples that are important in real life. (5) Burn 
the mathematics. (6) If you can't succeed in 4, burn 3.” 
22 Björndal and Dupont (2005, p.6-7) argued that the shadow price of a quota is the price of the additional unit 
of quota fish minus the change in restricted profits. This study remains with the standard definition. 
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With an elasticity is larger than zero, two inputs have a substitution relationship, if it is 
negative, they are complements (Chambers, 1988, p.96) and visa versa for outputs. Absolute 
values larger than one indicate a more than proportional (elastic), below one an inelastic 
reaction. The reaction is composed of the effect of an adjustment of outputs (expansion effect) 
and inputs (substitution/complement effects), similar to the Slutzky-decomposition in 
consumer theory (Chambers 1988, p.135, Squires, 1987b, p.561). 
 
The relationship between flexible and externally fixed items is captured by the so called 
elasticity of intensity (Jensen, 2002, p.21). It measures the reaction on a marginal change in 
the constrained in- or output:  
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Demand and supply are again affected in two ways, the decisions to change volumes and/or to 
change compositions (Ekerhovd, 2007, p.7). For inputs, values smaller than zero indicate 
substitutes, larger than one complements (Jensen, 2002, p.21), visa versa for outputs. 
Depending on the actual form of the function, all these concepts may differ with level of in- 
and outputs of course. In addition it must be kept in mind that these are all short run measures.  
 
The ‘scale’ of operation is captured in different ways23. Product specific economies of scale 
focus on one output: does an extra unit in- or decrease profits per unit? In dual functions, they 
are approximated by incremental marginal costs defined as (Asche et al., 2005, p.54):  
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where a negative sign implies decreasing marginal costs and hence increasing returns and a 
positive sign visa versa while zero indicates constant returns24.  If it is more profitable to 
produce outputs together than by themselves, that is measured by the economies of scope. 
Those are approximated by so called cost complementarity (Jensen et al., 2004, p.6): 
                                                 
23 This is not an exhaustive list of such concepts. Others are found for example in Squires (1987b). 
24 A profit function is in the single output case for obvious reasons only defined for decreasing returns to scale. 
This does not carry over to the multi-output case (Squires, 1987b, 562). Also regulations on total catch 
quantities or inputs may provoke increasing returns. 
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Values are interpreted as described above25. What the author of this study is concerned about 
is that these are nothing else than derivatives of the supply functions. An increase as a 
reaction on an own price change, as prescribed by theory, is interpreted as economies of scale. 
Similarly, if species are complements there are diseconomies, if they are substitutes 
economies of scale. These short run concepts contain no more information than the elasticities 
presented earlier. This is unsatisfying. Lacking further understanding, the formulas are not 
used in this study. The concept of multi-output economies of scale, profits per unit reactions 
to increases in all outputs, is disregarded since the phenomenon is hardly met in fishery reality 
(Jensen, 2002, p.26)26. 
2.6.3 Dual theory 
This thesis employs the dual theorem. It claims that the study of the outcome of optimisation 
behaviour directly suffices to describe technology. The economic behaviour is 'known' (read: 
assumed) by the modeller so it 'guides' the choices limited by technology which in turn is the 
only unknown in this metaphorical equation. Behavioural concepts such as the restricted 
profit function are hence “sufficient statistics” to describe technology and other external 
environment characteristics (McFadden, 1978, p.4). The advantage relevant to empirical work 
is that fewer restrictions are imposed a priori on economic-technological properties. The 
optimisation problem is not solved explicitly so no production function simple enough in its 
form to allow that is needed (Chambers, 1988, p.158-1). 
 
Another way out are so called non-parametric approaches. Those techniques, such as data 
envelopment analysis, circumvent the problem of specifying the functional form of the 
production process. For example McWhinnie (2006) employed non-parametric techniques to 
quantify the impacts of quota introduction in the Norwegian coastal NEAC fishery. But these 
techniques lack a behavioural model, they describe only technology. 
                                                 
25 By using cost complementarity, the possibility of the fixed costs of a multi-species fishery being less than the 
fixed costs of two separate fisheries as a source of scope effects is omitted (Jensen, 2002, p.24).   
26  Weaver (1983, p.47) suggests the ratio of input shares over output shares as a measure for overall short run 
economies of scale. This study thinks is not helpful to simply ask whether firms make profits.  
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2.7 Simplification: aggregation and independence 
The solution is either to simplify ... or [to] give up...” (Chambers, 1988 p.118) 
 
The concepts above established the relations between the various in- and outputs. The next 
step is to search for patterns. The possibly most common simplification is to aggregate several 
variables into one composite. The requirements for that to be valid are discussed. In 
multidimensional technologies two more questions are commonly raised: Can the choice of 
which outputs to produce be seen as independent of which inputs to use? If, all outputs can be 
aggregated into one, all inputs into another composite. Secondly, can the production of each 
output be viewed as a separate process? Then modelling may proceed species-wise. 
2.7.1 Aggregation of in- and outputs 
It is commonly understood that economic analysis is not really interested in detailed accounts 
of single products, but more rough categories of inputs and outputs instead, say fuel, capital, 
labour, bycatch and so forth. Compounds are formed. Especially in bio-economic models it is 
usual to use just one composite input called 'fishing effort'. It is thought of as the water 
screened by the vessel (Squires, 1987a, p.268). Is that admissible? If so, it is also 
advantageous for the estimation procedure. Less explanatory variables means less parameters 
to be estimated and less degrees of freedom used up, lending more precision to the estimate.   
 
It is common to think of the process of harvesting fish of being composed of different stages. 
In the case of a 'fishing effort', at the first stage 'screened water' is produced. After that 'catch' 
is produced by choosing how much 'water to screen' (Squires, 1987a p.268). In case of more 
first stage composites, say 'skipper and crew skills', those are combined at the second stage. 
The processes at the same stage must be independent of each other. Otherwise, if for example 
'screening of water' requires some of the inputs captured in 'skills', then the two aggregates 
contain common elements and are nonsensical (Chambers, 1988, p.45).  
 
The arguments are similar for outputs. Coastal vessels catch fifty-something different species. 
For those economically relevant, it is of interest if they can be aggregated into classes of fish. 
This should mirror the fishermen's targeting of fish. Suppose a fisher sets out to fish at a 
certain fishing ground where he expects some species X. If he also expects species Y at the 
same time and there is no way for him to catch them separately, those should be aggregated.  
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Prior knowledge about the harvesting process, such as common feeding grounds or migration 
patterns of species may suggest certain aggregations. But incorrect aggregation may cause 
misspecification errors. Hence statistical methods using the information contained in the 
dataset help to test the initial intuition27. The aim is to place restrictions on the technology 
that can be tested (Chambers, 1988, p.36). But also the data availability plays a role. It often 
requires employing aggregate data and accepting implicit aggregations. 
 
The mathematical requirement is called 'separability'. The restricted profit function must be 
weakly separable in prices: a change in a price outside the composite may have no impact on 
the relative contributions of any two variables in the composite (Chambers, 1988, p.110-115, 
152-155). For restricted variables, a change in the restriction outside the formed composite 
may not be influential. Formally:  
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Expressed in the demand and supply elasticities, it can be shown that separability 
requires jviv εε = , for i, j in the same price composite and v all other items. 
 
If that is fulfilled, price indices could hence be constructed by some aggregator function.  It 
should secure that actual changes in all inputs are correctly mirrored by the change in the 
aggregate input. In mathematical terms, the aggregator function needs to be homothetic 
(Chambers, 1988, p.37, 115). A homothetic function is a “monotonic transformation of 
function that is homogeneous of degree one” (Varian, 1992, p.18).  
2.7.2 Input-output separability and jointness in inputs 
If aggregation of all inputs and all outputs into two composites is possible, this stringent 
economic-technological property is called output-input separability. Fishermen then view the 
decisions of which species to target and how to combine inputs as independent. Species are 
selected with regard to species prices and regulatory as well as biological conditions. Factors 
are chosen such that the 'costs of effort' are minimised, while the same kind of 'effort' is used 
regardless of species. This implies that changes in relative prices of fish have no influence on 
the factor combination within effort and visa versa. It is usually tested by strong separability: 
                                                 
27 Chambers (1988 p. 157): “Which inputs go into each aggregate input? Although by no means trivial, the best 
answer one can hope for in most situations is one based on some hazy (and hopefully common sense) 
partition of inputs that has at best shaky scientific foundations”.  
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variables from another composite have no impact at all on the composite (Squires, 1987a, 
p.270). For restricted factors changes in the allocated quota or the inputs are instead relevant. 
This would make modelling a lot simpler but with few exceptions the large majority of 
empirical studies investigating output-input separability rejects it (Asche et al., 2005, p.17). 
 
Jointness in inputs is a property of a different kind. The question now is whether the 
production processes for different species are dependent. If the NEAC fishery was nonjoint in 
inputs from all other fisheries, then one could neglect other species and justify a single-
species analysis. But on the contrary, if they are joint, a regulatory regime for only cod might 
have additional unintended consequences for other species (Squires, 1987a, p.269). Two 
reasons for jointness exist: firstly, the production processes themselves may be related. As a 
simple example, when fishing with a net, some species may appear usually at the same 
location and hence are caught together. That would mean the same, physically identical inputs 
are used for fishing different species28. Secondly, the existence of one or more fixed factors 
that can be allocated between the different outputs creates jointness. If a vessel’s fishing time 
is not fully used up by fishing in one main, maybe seasonal, fishery, then it may be used in 
another instead. Jointness leads to cost or anti-cost complementarity and thus economies of 
scope (Jensen et al., 2004, p.11, Ekerhovd, 2007, p.3)29. This highlights that this discussion is 
just an extension of the previous section. Practically, it is required that a price change in one 
output does not affect the profits in another fishery (Jensen, 2002, p.12):  
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To conclude, it is noted that input-output separability implies jointness in inputs. If all species 
can be treated together as a composite 'fish', one mostly does not maximise independently. 
One exemption exists: if the optimisation processes are identical and only differ in scale, the 
economic activity of a fishing vessel is nonjoint as well as output-input separable. 
Mathematically the processes are identical “scalar multiples” (Squires, 1987a, p.271).  
                                                 
28  A list of more reasons for jointness in the production process is given in Squires (1987b, p.561). 
29 The anti-cost complementarity Jensen et al. (2004, p.11-2) find between a regulated and an unregulated 
species indicates that it would be beneficial to harvest the more valuable regulated species only. But the 
regulation creates an opportunity cost of being idle. In years with low quotas it pays to  fish more of the 
unregulated species. So instead of it being be beneficial to harvest both species separately it is merely the 
second best alternative to harvest the unregulated species instead of not harvesting it at all.  
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2.8 More issues: aggregation over vessels and cost assignment 
A digression on two practical concerns for theoretical modelling concludes the theory part: 
aggregation over individuals and the assignment of cost. The neoclassic production theory 
was formulated and formalised above on individual level. That means a single fisher (more 
precisely the one owning and, in the current context, most likely also operating a vessel) is 
subject of the theory. But the subject of interest is not the individual fisher but a fleet segment. 
A gap is created by the heterogeneity of individuals: not every vessel has the same size, age 
and capacity, catches the same compositions and amounts of fish using the same gears. The 
data is available on individual level. If it would consist of long enough time series, one could 
estimate the profit function for each vessel separately and subsequently aggregate them. But 
the data consists of an unbalanced panel and individuals cannot be considered by themselves. 
The usual question raised is under which conditions analysis of aggregate data is consistent 
with underlying individual responses (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p.105).  If one ignores those so 
called aggregation conditions the function may not reflect the segments behaviour adequately, 
so called aggregation bias (Kim, 2005, p.19). With the availability of individual data the same 
issue gets another twist, evaluation at the mean vessel may suffer from disaggregation bias 
(Halvorsen, 2006, p.12). This study will aggregate the estimated responses for each vessel, 
resulting in an average response curve for the sample which can be sized up appropriately to 
the population size. Given the sample is representative this represents the population 
response30. 
 
Secondly, a further practical question is how and if the costs should be assigned to the 
different fish species caught? It may look artificial to determine the cost of a single species. 
The fisher possibly would not operate, or at least not in the way he does, if there was only that 
single species. But bio-economic models may require looking at one species at a time. 
Sandberg (2006, p.1018) is the only study the author is aware of that explicitly developed and 
employed a method to assign costs to a certain species. He looked at the months the vessel 
was active and assumed that in those activity and costs were equally distributed. Next, 
monthly catch data was used to assign the activity each month to a species relative to the total 
catch. This requires monthly data and assumes that inputs are independent of outputs so that a 
composite effort can be employed. Hence the method is not applicable but mentioned to 
highlight the unresolved issue. 
                                                 
30 I am indebted to Tore Schweder for this suggestion (personal communication). 
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PART III –Empirical model and estimation  
After exposing the standard theory in the previous part, the study now closes in on the actual 
estimation. Firstly, the available data shall be discussed in the light of the economic theory. It 
is established which variables are used in the empirical analysis. Secondly, a complete 
econometric model requires the specification of a functional form as well as the stochastic 
part of the model. Kennedy (2003, p.81-2) argued that empiric work should not only be used 
to estimate but also to “search and evaluate” a model. This involved task is not undertaken 
here; rather the rich set of existing studies in fisheries is employed as guidance. Next, 
estimation methods are introduced. Subsequently the estimation and the statistical tests of the 
research questions are carried out, the results are discussed and the study is concluded.  
3.1 Data 
“Econometrics is much easier without data” (Kennedy, 2003, p.390) 
Now the available data sources are introduced and the choice of fleet segment is justified. 
Subsequently the variables to be included into the regression are selected.    
3.1.1 Sources and sampling procedure 
This study is based on data provided by the Directorate of Fisheries (FD) in Norway. In the so 
called profitability survey (in Norwegian: 'lønnsomhetsundersøkelse') each year a new sample 
of vessel owners is asked to report costs for several categories. Catch and revenues for the 
different fish species are also registered by the Directorate ('landings- og sluttseddelregister').  
 
The sample available is an unbalanced panel consisting of different cross-section samples 
collected each year. In order for the results of this study to be valid for the coastal fleet 
segments considered, the sample of each year must be representative. To that end, the total 
population is stratified by geographical association, length and coastal versus high sea fishery. 
The number of vessels drawn from each strata is determined based on a method called 
'proportional with size allocation' and the draw is random with each vessel having an equal 
probability to be in the sample once (FD, 2006, p.111-2). For the 2005-survey for example, 
758 vessel owners were contacted in the entire (high sea and coastal) fleet. Of those, 659 
responded. 648 reported data in a quality such that it could be used in the FD profitability 
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survey. The main problem was that the data was not specified enough (FD, 2006, p.17). The 
high number missing responses could be of concern if it has a systematic underlying cause. 
No such suggestions are made by FD. But Jensen's and Aarset's (2004) investigation into the 
motives for non-compliance in coastal fisheries suggests that there may be a systematic cause 
for the missing responses. Judgement is reserved.  
3.1.2 Vessels 
FD collects data on vessels operated the whole year. The criteria employed require a 
minimum number of days of operation per annum and a minimum revenue depending on the 
vessel size (FD, 2006, p.19). The division suggests that full time operation represents the 
main commercial activity for those involved. Other fishermen possibly have some additional 
occupation. It is a rather small share of all vessels registered that is operated all year long: for 
all Norwegian fisheries in 2005 it was 1678 vessels compared to 4749 vessels active but not 
all year long. The chosen demarcation is such that the former group caught 89.6 per cent of all 
fish landed in revenue terms. This suggests that a representative sample of vessels operating 
the whole year adequately represents the commercial fishing activity (FD, 2006, p. 20,138). 
FD sorts those boats by: (i) main fishery (demersal or pelagic species) (ii) coastal or high sea, 
(iii) length and (iv) geographical location (FD, 2006, p. 20). The data provided for this study 
is for coastal vessels fishing mainly bottom feeding species. Only those regions where NEAC 
appears, roughly categorized as north of 62° latitude are considered31. 
 
Vessels in the different regulation groups have different length and receive different quota 
types and allocations, suggesting treating those groups separately. Changes in categorisations 
of vessels in the profitability survey occurred in the years 1998 and 2003. No unique 
allocation between the different classifications exists. Therefore the study is based on the 
most recent three years only (2003-2005). The two largest length classes, 1 (less than 10 
meters) and 2 (10 to 15 meters), are treated together, a dummy for class 1 is used. Length 
classes 3 (15 – 21) and 4 (21 – 28), which received IVQs from 2004 onwards, are not 
considered due to too few observations32.  
 
Regarding vessels in the same class, heterogeneity could occur due to different regional 
availability of species; local stocks or migratory patterns being a possible explanation. That 
                                                 
31 The southernmost county is 'Sogn og Fjordane'. Only its most northern municipality is situated north of 62°. 
32 An estimation was attempted but the results were insignificant, supporting the suspicion.  
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could possibly be captured by the location of the fishermen if it approximated species 
distribution. This is not done to keep the analysis manageable. It already considers only those 
that fish cod. Further differences between vessels may occur due to their age, representing 
capital rigidity. A vessel owner to some extent may be 'stuck' with the technology purchased 
at a certain date. This is also left aside. Finally, the length groups contain all the different 
techniques mentioned earlier (section 2.5). Estimating them together assumes that they react 
in the same way on price incentives and regulations (Dupont, 1990, p.31). But difference may 
prevail and due to the strict regulations on who is allowed to fish how, it can not be assumed 
that ‘the market takes care of that’. Data availability does not allow estimating each technique 
by itself, a drawback of the data and this study.  
 
The total population of fishing boats changes over time. In the last years the number of 
vessels has gone down. As an indication, from 1998 to 2005 the number of all (coastal and 
high sea) vessels in demersal fisheries has been reduced by 35 per cent (FD, 2006, p.21). This 
can possibly partly be attributed to the transferability measures. A way to control for it would 
be a year dummy, but that would cause multicollinearity with other variables included and is 
hence not done (see section 3.3.1). 
3.1.3 Outputs – beyond the “torskefokus” 
One of the main advantages of this study is that it accesses quantity (in kg) as well as revenue 
(in real NOK) data on vessel level for all species. That allows considering price differences on 
vessel level and hence to account for different qualities caught. These presumably are 
explained by shifts in demand, gear selectivity and regional availability (see sections 2.3-2.5). 
The vessels in the sample catch different combinations of the 50-something species of fish 
and crustaceans. But many are bycatch. By looking at the summary statistics, the number of 
species relevant for the economic analysis can be reduced drastically. A species contributing 
almost nothing to a fisher's income is unlikely to impact his decisions and hence not included. 
 
Over half of the revenues any year over the past decade in the coastal demersal fisheries have 
been made with cod. The two further species that in terms of revenues stand out are haddock 
and saithe. Together with the NEAC they account for almost three quarters of the total 
revenues from 1998 to 2005. They are either the main or a secondary species. The individual 
prices of those three are included directly in the regression. The species behave similarly in 
terms of migration patterns, spawning ground and habitat. Hence it may be possible to 
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aggregate those33. That shall be tested. Further species identified as relevant by fleet segment 
revenues are monkfish, tusk, Greenland halibut, some herring34 species (in Norwegian: 
‘feitsild’), ling, mackerel, and redfish. Together those seven account for about 20 per cent of 
the total catch value in the period of 1998 – 2005 (about 15 per cent in 2005). They are not 
included individually due to estimation procedure limits ('curse of dimensionality').  
 
Focussing on aggregate revenues only is misleading. There are some fish species that do not 
contribute much to the total revenue but are important if not the primary species caught for 
some few vessels. Their stocks are relatively small. Besides some of the seven species 
mentioned above, a typical example is shellfish such as the red king crab. This heterogeneity 
poses a challenge to estimation. Ignoring those species but still using the vessels in the 
estimation means to estimate their economic behaviour disregarding their major income. 
Incorporating them directly is as mentioned not feasible. The strategy employed here is to 
include them as a composite 'others' which is revenue-weighted average. The price is chosen 
as relevant variable since most are not managed by IVQs35. Furthermore, observations for 
which 'other' species contribute much more to revenue than cod, haddock and saithe together 
it is assumed that those latter are not the fisheries of main interest. Somewhat arbitrarily, all 
observations for which ‘other’ species generate more than three times as much to revenue as 
cod, haddock and saithe are dropped. 
3.1.4 Inputs, profits and stocks 
FD asks respondents to categorise their expenses in the different categories ‘fuel’, ‘bait, salt, 
and storage’, ‘maintenance of vessel’ and ‘- gear’, some ‘unspecified costs’, ‘labour’, ‘viand’, 
‘social expenses’, three kinds of ‘taxes’, ‘vessel –‘ and ‘other insurance’, and 'depreciation'. 
What is obvious is that standard theory and reality are not congruent. Major costs arise from 
'inputs' not used in the immediate, physical production process. Data on prices or quantities 
has to be accessed elsewhere or approximated. The following selection was made: 
 
                                                 
33 I am thankful to Gjert Dingsør, CEES, for this suggestion (personal communication).  
34 Herring is more important than that to the Norwegian fisheries: they are the main species for the pelagic 
fishery. But in the demersal coastal fishery just some stocks that migrate into the fjords are targeted.   
35 This is undesirable because the aggregation does not fulfil the theoretical requirements formulated above. 
The composite (and its price)  is made up by all species while all vessels only fish a few of those. Hence an 
interpretation of the coefficients should be done with a possible aggregation bias in mind (Squires, 1987b, 
p.567). 
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Fuel: The price of fuel is approximated by an annual average fuel price, the Statistics Norway 
fuel price index36 (SSB, 2007a), It is implicitly assumed that fishermen face the same prices, 
which appears reasonable. Alternatively, an individual price has been derived by Bjørndal and 
Gordon (2000, p.5) by constructing a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function of length and catch 
quantity, approximating fuel quantity, receiving individual prices.  
 
Labour: The wage should determine how many crew members are employed how long. 
Vessel specific wages cannot be derived since the number of crew members is not available. 
Because the crew is paid in part by shares of the catch value, even if it was, it could not be 
utilised without simultaneity problems in the estimation (Salvanes and Squires, 1995, p.8). 
Instead, some opportunity cost is used. The annual average industry wage (in real NOK) from 
Statistics Norway is chosen37 (SSB, 2007b). One could in addition differentiate between costs 
of a skipper and of a crew member (Squires, 1987b, p.566). This is not followed, implicitly 
assuming owner-operation. This approach makes a special treatment of viand and social costs 
infeasible. Those should, as part of the total labour costs, be captured by the opportunity costs. 
While labour costs are reported, labour quality (commonly termed ‘skill’) is despite its 
importance for economic performance (Kirkley et al., 1998) neither observable nor 
approximated (for example by years of experience of the captain or in a balanced panel by 
fixed effects regression). This limitation needs to be considered in the empirical model since it 
may lead to omitted variable bias. 
 
Bait, salt and storage: The aggregation of bait with inputs used to treat the catch after it is 
hauled in is problematic from this study’s perspective. It has no obvious rationale and is 
possibly not theoretically sound (see section 2.7.1). In addition, the use of bait at least 
depends heavily on the gear type – nets do not employ bait, longline does. Almost half the 
coastal fleet does not report any costs in this category and the share of it in total costs is on 
aggregate only five per cent. The price of such inputs has been approximated by a price index 
for materials (Asche et al., 2005, p.121) or by dividing the expenses by an approximation of 
the quantity, either total catch (Nøstbakken, 2006, p.1880) or operating days (Gordon et al., 
2002, p.9). Both methods appear to be vague approximations. In the present study, the former 
causes perfect multicollinearity with fuel and labour indices since only three observations 
exist for each of them. Based on all these considerations, the variable is left aside.  
                                                 
36 SSB prisindex engroshandel drivstoff og brensle 
37 SSB beregnet årslønn for heltidsansatte i industri 
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Capital: It was mentioned earlier (section 0.1) that capital in form of fishing vessels is 
regarded as inflexible. Fishermen are unable to adjust the capacity of their vessels on a yearly 
basis to match the uncertain availability of fish. Thus vessel capacity is treated as fixed. As an 
approximation vessel length (in meter) is included (FD, 2006). Depreciation, representing 
wear and tear of the vessel throughout time, is also assumed a fixed cost. The costs of the 
investment into a vessel in use for maybe several decades shall be spread over that time. Most 
likely a fisherman’s accountant follows some depreciation calculation method and the 
reported costs of depreciation are independent of vessel usage.  
 
Unspecified items: This category comprises according to FD of harbour services and fees, 
administration, telephone, etc. It is treated as a flexible cost component by earlier studies. 
Costs are aggregated with other components into ‘miscellaneous’ and individual prices are 
approximated by dividing by some ‘activity’ measure (Nøstbakken, 2006, p.1880, Gordon et 
al., 2002, p.9). But does the wage of a worker helping to unpack in a harbour have significant 
impact – or is it more likely that he is simply called upon when the catch is large? Do the 
harbour fees really determine how often long to stay at sea – or is it the weather and the 
availability of fish? Based on such considerations this study will treat the costs as fixed, 
related only to the fact that the fisher is active and possibly to the size of the vessel. Hence no 
additional variable is included. 
 
Insurance of vessel and other items: Insurance is basically meant to prevent the loss of large 
values (either a trip’s catch or the vessel itself) from unforeseeable events (extreme weather 
conditions for example). Its coverage and specific details should maximise the risk averse 
fisherman’s profits, following standard theory38. It has been treated as a flexible cost 
component (Nøstbakken, 2006, p.1880, Gordon et al., 2002, p.9). Practically an insurance 
policy can be changed within a year’s time. However, this study wants to suggest that vessel 
insurance possibly is purchased once when the vessel is bought and adjusted every now and 
then. It is not chosen optimally on a yearly basis but ‘something you need to have’. Hence it is 
assumed to be a fixed cost component related to the vessel and its activity possibly. No 
additional variable is hence included. 
 
                                                 
38  Obviously the study contradicts itself here to some extent, because it assumes a risk neutral firm and does 
not treat any uncertainties explicitly. That is a limitation of the framework. 
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Vessel and gear maintenance: Those two cost components refer to all repairs and 
replacements done on vessel or gear. One could treat these as running costs dependent on how 
much the vessel and gear are used, approximating quantity by activity again (Nøstbakken, 
2006, p.1880). The time horizon of the data (one year) is sufficient for that. A second 
alternative, followed here, is to treat those costs as part of the investment into the vessel. The 
choice is to either repair today or to invest into new equipment or a new hull later. It is 
suggested that the planning horizon is much longer than a single year and the maintenance 
choice is part of the investment decision not captured by this model. Consequently these 
components are left aside. 
 
Taxes: All taxes are raised from the same tax base, gross revenue, and can hence be 
subsumed into one category. The tax base suggests considering taxes solely as a profit 
reducing position. Taxes are based on revenue and as such have, according to neoclassical 
standard arguing, the impact to lower the marginal revenues and thus the incentive to fish.  
 
Profits:  Since the analysis views all vessel related inputs as fixed it defines short run profits 
as the revenues less the flexible costs less taxes.  
 
Stocks: Due to the short time horizon multicollinearity inhibits including yearly stock 
variables. Within the three years considered, stocks of all three species have however varied 
by less than 20 per cent. The earlier cited study by Sandberg (2006, p.1012) estimated an 
elasticity of the costs with respect to the stock of 0.21. 
3.1.5 Summing up 
An estimation is carried for the length classes 1 and 2 for the years 2003 – 2005. Two input 
prices, a fuel index and an annual average wage (in real NOK) and one instrument for vessel 
capital, its length, are included. It will be tested if they can be subsumed into one single 
aggregate 'effort'. Individual species prices for cod, haddock saithe and a composite 'other 
species' are available (in NOK/kg). Having identified the variables, the subsequent step is to 
turn the theoretical model into an empirical one. 
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3.2 Empirical specification 
  “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” (George Box in: Kennedy, 2003, p.81) 
 
An empirical model consists of the model specification and the stochastic specification. The 
former contains the theoretical model and specifies the functional form. In part II a system of 
a restricted profit function and individual demand and supply functions with all the typical 
properties has been specified. Interesting from an empirical analysis point of view is that 
theory imposes a structure on the data39: by its assumptions it claims 'this is what reality looks 
like'. To repeat, it states that a fisher is solely interested in maximising his earnings from the 
fishery and that he hence reacts on prices of fish and inputs. The function capturing this 
behaviour needs to be monotonic, homogeneous and have a certain shape. Therefore, so 
called flexible functional forms are discussed and a choice is made. The stochastic 
specification contains everything not captured by the deterministic theory: linear systems of 
regression equations are presented. The standard tool of econometric analysis, classical linear 
regression (CLR), is not applicable in this study. Firstly, the model specification defines a 
system of equations and restrictions on and in between parameters, not a single linear 
equation. Secondly, this also affects the stochastic specification. Therefore, the method of 
seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) is presented before the study proceeds to 
the actual estimation.  
3.2.1 The choice of a functional form 
“[Econometric] ... models are metaphors, or windows, through which researchers view the observable 
world ... [T]heir adoption depends not on whether they can be deemed 'true' but rather upon whether 
they can be said to (a) correspond to the facts, and (b) be useful.” (Kennedy, 2003, p.81) 
 
In the line with (a) and (b) a functional form is obliged on the one hand to reflect the 
theoretical efforts and on the other has to be estimated with the greatest possible ease. More 
operationally, Lau (1986, p.1520) stated five criteria of selection: (1) Theoretical consistency 
requires a functional form to meet the theoretical restrictions imposed, at least for the values 
variables in the study take (Lau, 1986, p.1520). Practically it often implies “strong restrictions 
on the admissible range of the values of the parameters” (Lau, 1986, p.1520). This 
                                                 
39 There may be a two-way interaction. Certain relationships observed in the data may suggest a theory. The 
frauds to be avoided are to tailor the theory to the data at hand ('data mining') or to ignore that a theory just 
does not hold (Kennedy, 2003). 
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necessitates to define the (2) domain of applicability, the “set of values of the independent 
variables over which the algebraic functional form satisfies all the requirements for theoretical 
consistency.” (Lau, 1986, p.1527) “Global theoretical consistency” is achieved if the entire 
space over which the independent variables are defined is permissible. This is in practice 
almost never achievable. 'Local theoretical consistency' instead requires defining a subset of 
the independent variable space for which the form is consistent with theory (Lau, 1986, 
p.1532). Anticipating the class of considered functions, applicability hinges on monotonicity 
and concavity/convexity (del Valle, 2003, p.67). (3) The functional form is flexible if it is 
able to accommodate the restrictions as well as estimate all required parameters 
independently: “It allows the data the opportunity to provide information about the critical 
parameters” (Lau, 1986, p.1544)40. (4) Computational facility, the ease of estimation, is 
subdivided into several complementary elements: the function (a) should be linear in 
parameters, (b) itself and its derivatives of interest should be in closed form, (c) all equations 
in a system should have the same form and (d) the number of parameters to be estimated 
should be as small as possible given the purpose of the estimation. The last element together 
with the flexibility property implies that the number of parameters optimally is exactly the 
number of effects to be determined: less means effects are not independent; more means that 
the model is over-parameterised and wastes degrees of freedom (Lau, 1986, p.1545-6). (5) 
Factual conformity is some kind of double-check to not create nonsense; general, stylized 
facts about the issue at hand should not be contradicted (Lau, 1986, p. 1546).  
 
So which functions meet those requirements? Production theory in fisheries frequently 
employed the so called 'flexible forms', the transcendental logarithmic (translog) and the 
generalized Leontief (both explained shortly). How come? Historically, they emerged in the 
early 1970s41 as a response to the 'inflexibility' of the so far used work-horses Cobb-Douglas 
and CES, when developments in computer science enabled their computation. The so called 
symmetric normalised quadratic (SNQ) was a further development (Kohli, 1993, p.243-4). 
Below they are explained and a function for this study is chosen. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 More specific: “Flexibility means the ability … to approximate arbitrary but theoretically consistent 
behaviour through an appropriate choice of the parameters.” (Lau, 1986, p. 1539 – 40)  
41 The Leontief was first used by Diewert in 1971 and the translog by Christensen, Jorgenson  and Lau in 1973 
(Lau, 1986 p.1529). The latter was invented though by Kmenta in 1967 (Greene, 2003, p.367). 
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'Flexible' forms defined 
Some function linear in parameters but possibly nonlinear in variables (criterion 4a) allows 
estimating as many effects as one wishes by simply adding econometric variables (criterion 
3)42. One specific linear form is the so called generalized quadratic function. All economic 
variables enter transformed by some so far unspecified function; separately as well as 
multiplied by themselves and with all other variables. The translog function in turn specifies 
the transformation for all economic variables as the natural logarithm. In the generalized 
Leontief function they are transformed by square roots instead (Jorgenson, 1986, p.1845-6, 
Chambers, 1988, p.160-64, 170-2). The SNQ is, as its name suggests, also of the quadratic 
form. It is normalised by price and quantity indices (Kohli, 1993, p.247). 
  
The choice of the transformation should of course be supported by economic theory. 
Explaining the translog form intuitively, Jorgenson (1986, p.1845) started 'the other way 
round', what he referred to as the “natural approach”. To circumvent that the common 
elasticities are forced to be constant, he used a 'trick': he defined so called share elasticities. 
Those measure the reaction of the cost or revenue shares associated with an input or output 
respectively. He then assumed that those are constant43 and used them as parameters. That 
allows the Marshallian elasticities to vary. Assuming linearity and integrating by all prices 
and fixed variables, one gets linear cost and revenue shares after the first and a restricted 
profit function of the translog form after the second integration (Jorgenson, 1986, p.1855). So 
the translog function has been retrieved by focussing on 'what one is interested in', trying to 
avoid arbitrary restrictions on the economic-technological effects, making estimation as easy 
as possible. 
 
Choice of a function: the issue of applicability 
Returning to the five criteria, the desired flexibility in general is fulfilled, so are 
computational facility and theoretical consistency. But for all generalized quadratic functional 
forms the flexibility is lost when imposing separability. That requires more restrictions on the 
parameters than 'available' – there are not enough parameters free to estimate all effects 
independently any longer (Chambers, 1988, p.175). Furthermore, both the generalised 
                                                 
42 Here a distinction must be made between econometric and economic variables. The economic variables enter 
multiplicatively, forming 'new' econometric variables. The natural logarithm is applied to the economic 
variables.    
43 The author is not aware of any economic intuition behind that assumption nor why it is more reasonable than 
fixed Hicksian or Marshallian elasticities.   
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Leontief and the translog are not generally applicable if they are to be flexible. A first obvious 
limitation of the translog is that it is limited in its range of applicability since the natural 
logarithm of negative numbers is not defined.  In a tedious procedure the local properties have 
to be checked for ex post since even if all profits were positive convexity is not secured (del 
Valle et al, 2003, p.67). In the rare case that global applicability can be achieved, this amounts 
in giving up the flexibility of the function. The same is true for the imposition of global 
convexity for the generalised Leontief. In this case, factors can no longer be complements 
(Kohli, 1993, p.244).  The SNQ seemingly overcomes the trade-off between applicability and 
flexibility (Kohli, 1993, p.253-4). Lacking contrary evidence, it appears that it is the ‘best 
choice’ in the current context. But though widely used, this function appears less established 
in the literature. The author has not come across a thorough discussion of its properties and 
limitations. Hence it is not used here but the translog is chosen44. For the estimation attempted 
the model specification hence is (Bergman, 1997, p.253):   
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 i, k = prices fuel, labour, cod, haddock, saithe and 'others' 
Si > 0: revenue shares cod, haddock, saithe, 'others', Si < 0: cost shares fuel, labour 
 
Theoretical restrictions in restricted profit translog 
Linear homogeneity requirements in the translog take the form (Bergman, 1997, p.253): 
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Instead of imposing the constraints directly, one price can be used to normalise other prices 
and profit (Bergman, 1997, p.253). The respective share equation is dropped and its 
parameters regained from the sums above. The price of fuel is used. Symmetry of the cross-
effects is secured by:  
(XIII) kiik ββ =  in and among all equations.  
Monotonicity and shape requirements can only be verified ex post.  
                                                 
44  Since computational efforts are high, the two forms are not used parallel in this study. 
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Elasticities and scale measures in the restricted profit translog 
The own price and cross price elasticities are retrieved as (Berndt, 1991, 475):  
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The elasticity of intensity is calculated as:  
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The shadow price is retrieved as follows (Norsworthy and Zabala, 1985, p.994, Berndt, 1991, 
p.470)45: 
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3.2.2 Stochastic specification –linear system of regression equations 
After establishing a functional form, the complete econometric model including its stochastic 
properties is presented. The econometric model applicable is referred to as a system of 
regression equations. Besides comprising of multiple equations it is defined by containing 
exactly one endogenous variable per equation; its regressand (Biørn, 2003, p.103). The 
current study employs individual data and due to the presumed industry structure (section 2.3) 
output and input prices are exogenous for the individual. Moreover, the main species are 
regulated by a TAC and aggregate supply is externally determined. The model also allows for 
restrictions on parameters not only on parameters from one but also across different equations 
from the system (Biørn, 2003, p.103). 
 
A stochastic disturbance term is added to each equation in the deterministic model46 
(equations X and XI). Each disturbance by itself needs to be ‘classically well behaved’: it has 
an expected value of zero and is homoscedastic and non-autocorrelated. New is that the 
disturbances among the different equations may be correlated contemporaneously: some 
external influences may affect different factors or species at the same time. 
 
 
                                                 
45  Norsworthy’s and Zabala’s formula (for a cost function) multiplies the derivative of the translog with the 
fixed factor and divides by the profit. This is not in line with theory, possibly a typing error.  
46  According to Berndt (1997, p.471), it is not internally consistent to have additive homoscedastic disturbances 
in both the restricted profit and the share equations. Squires (1987c, p.237) though defended the profit 
function disturbance by an approximation error and the share equation disturbances by optimization errors.  
  
45 
(XVII) 
πθθθθ θδθθαβθαββπ uqqqq i
I
i
iki
I
i
I
k
iki
I
i
i ++++++= ∑∑∑∑
== ==
lnlnlnln
2
1lnln
2
1lnlnln
11 11
0  
hki
I
i
kihk uqS +++= ∑
=
θδββ θ lnln
1
  
1
1
=∑
=
I
i
iβ , 0
1
=∑
=
I
i
ikβ  for all k and 0
1
=∑
=
I
i
iθδ  for k, i= cod, haddock, saithe, others, labour 
0)( =iuE  ⎩⎨
⎧
≠
==
yx
yx
uuE mjjymx ,0
,
)(
σ
for m, j = profit cod haddock saithe others labour,  
x, y = 1,…, N47. 
 
It is apparent that one would receive unbiased results estimating each equation by itself by 
OLS. However, this approach neglects among other things the information contained in the 
restrictions across the equations on the parameters of the model: the share equations ‘inherit’ 
their parameters from the restricted profit function. OLS cannot capture this and hence is not 
the minimum variance linear unbiased estimator48. So an estimation procedure taking in-
between-equations information into account is needed – that is SURE.  
3.2.3 The seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE) 
The SURE procedure 'compresses' the structural model's equations into a single econometric 
one. All dependent variables are aggregated into one (a more detailed description is found in 
Biørn, 2003, p.106-7). The linear symmetry restrictions are introduced into the system by 
replacing parameters. Each restriction implies estimation of one parameter less. The variables 
associated with restricted parameters are now linear combinations of the original variables 
(Kennedy, 2003 p.218-9, Biørn, 2003 p.132-3). 
 
The disturbances of this composite equation are now, by definition, autocorrelated and 
heteroscedastic since each original equation by itself had its own disturbance variance and 
contemporaneous correlation was assumed. OLS on this equation is not efficient and, more 
importantly, inference is inhibited by the biased estimates of the estimator's variance. But a 
generalised least square (GLS) estimator is efficient. It transforms the whole equation for each 
                                                 
47  For notational convenience the observation index is left out in the restricted profit and the share equations. 
48  This is the criterion for linear estimators employed here. It is not unchallenged of course. For a discussion of 
estimator properties, see Kennedy, 2003, Ch 2. 
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observation so as to equip all with an identical expected variance and to remove the 
autocorrelation. The disturbance variance-covariance matrix needs to be known for this 
procedure. This is obviously this is not the case. Instead, the moments are estimated from 
their natural estimator, the residuals from OLS estimation of each equation by itself. By that 
the procedure is turned into feasible generalized least square (FGLS) (Biørn, 2003, p.107-12). 
That however means to give up the small sample property of unbiasedness: the procedure 
yields consistent estimates for the disturbances but not unbiased ones. In turn the estimates in 
the composite equation inherit this property as well and are consistent (Greene, 2003, p.345).  
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the equations needs to be dropped. The FGLS estimator is 
sensitive to which equation is dropped, which is undesirable. A suggested solution is to 
estimate the FGLS estimator iteratively. That is, after each observation the newly estimated 
residuals replace the so far used estimates for the disturbances. The estimation is repeated 
until some convergence criterion is fulfilled. It can be shown to yield a maximum likelihood 
estimator (ML)49 (Berndt, 1991, p.463, Greene, 2003, p.347).  
3.3 Estimation, results and testing procedures  
To recall, the estimation is based on the length classes 1 and 2 in the years 2003 to 2005 (data 
summary appendix A1). There are in total 695 observations. Of these, 21 are dropped since it 
is assumed that the cod, haddock and saithe fisheries are of minor importance (section 3.1.3). 
Due to missing values for saithe and haddock, the used software Stata drops further 
observations in the estimation so that the sample contains finally 644 observations. Searching 
for erroneous data one can identify either outliers (observations with an unusual value for a 
dependent variable) or high leverage observations (having an unusual value for an 
independent variable), both having a strong undesirable influence on the estimation (Chen et 
al., 2003). Preliminary inspection of the scatterplots led to discard one observation since the 
price of cod was unreasonably high (appendix A2). The issue is not pursued by more formal 
procedures50.  
 
Firstly it is now asked whether the economic and econometric theory assumptions hold and 
the results are interpretable. Next, the economic-technological measures of interest are 
presented and interpreted.  
                                                 
49 The ML principle secures that the obtained 'real world' parameter estimates are those that give the greatest 
probability to obtain the actually observed data (Kennedy, 2003, p.23). 
50 The data are already  prepared for statistical purposes by FD. 
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3.3.1 Judging the estimation  
The estimation by iterative SURE converges after eight iterations (appendices A3, B1). The 
parameter values for the price of fuel are regained from the homogeneity restrictions 
(appendices A4, B2) (Berndt, 1991, p.473). The theoretical requirement to be tested ex post is 
the domain of applicability (section 3.2.1). To recall, the restricted profit function needs to 
be monotone, convex in prices for outputs and concave in input prices. The estimated translog 
form is required to fulfil this requirement locally, which is for each observation in the dataset. 
However, this ex post analysis almost always leads to violations and opinions on appropriate 
treatment divert (del Valle et al., 2003, p.68)51. Hence it is left aside. 
 
For the econometric model to be applicable and the results interpretable, the model and the 
stochastic specification need to be correct. Firstly, one should confirm that the model is not 
misspecified. It needs to be (1) linear, the parameters must be (2) correctly specified as 
constant or flexible and it may not suffer from (3) over-parameterisation, (4) omitted variable 
bias or (5) simultaneity (Kennedy, 2003, p.107-12). (1) The functional form was not chosen 
with regard to the data but solely determined by theoretical considerations. The translog can 
be interpreted as a second order Taylor series approximation, hence it can approximate any 
twice-differentiable functional form (Chambers, 1988, p.164) and ‘gives the data the freedom 
to decide’. (2) Are the estimated parameters are really constants? Flexible functional forms 
ended the era of constant price elasticities, at the expense of constant share elasticities. This 
study does not judge this ‘trade-off’. (4) If a relevant variable is left out that is correlated with 
another explanatory variable, that causes most notably a bias. The error term containing the 
omitted variable and the explanatory variable are correlated (endogeneity). It may occur in 
this study since the skipper skills are not reported and may be related to the vessel 
characteristics but cannot be tested ex post easily. (3) Superfluous variables decrease the 
degrees of freedom and render the estimates less efficient. The study relies on the tight 
theoretical prescriptions of production theory. (5) Simultaneity also causes a correlation 
between disturbance term and independent variable. The author is not aware of formal ex post 
tests in the SURE model. However, a model with competitive markets and individual data 
does not suffer from simultaneity (section 2.3). 
 
                                                 
51 Del Valle et al., 2003, p.68: “In practice there is no unanimity of the minimum percentage of observations 
that should verify quasiconcavity (...).  Nevertheless, a test of convexity cannot be interpreted as a strict test 
of the assumption of profit maximization implied by quasiconcavity, because the flexible functional form 
may violate quasi-concavity even if the data comes from well-behaved technologies ...” 
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One typical problem in linear estimation is the prevalence of heteroscedasticity or 
autocorrelation, causing inefficient estimates and incorrect test statistics. Beyond the 
preliminary visual inspection, usual OLS tests are the White-test and the Breusch-Pagan test 
(Kennedy, 2003, p 13-8). However, the very purpose of FGLS estimation is to deal with 
nonspherical disturbances. The residuals are hence per definition well behaved52. 
 
Multicollinearity has already been named as a practical concern. A perfect linear relationship 
between some of the independent variables causes the least squares procedure to break down 
(it demands a division by zero to be performed). This happens for example when including 
both an intercept, the opportunity cost of labour and the price for materials into the regression, 
since the latter two both contain only three possible values. A high degree of multicollinearity 
on the other hand causes high estimates of the parameters' standard errors. The parameter 
estimates loose precision but retain all desirable properties. In OLS, a high R2 combined with 
insignificant parameters point at the problem (Kennedy, 2003, p.205-9). In the current SURE 
estimation, significant parameters exist. A look at the correlation matrix for the explanatory 
variables reveals that no high correlation between two variables exists (appendix A5). The 
author is not aware of formal test procedures for multicollinearity in SURE.  
 
Standard statistical testing procedures also require normally distributed disturbances. 
Visual inspection by plotting the density of the estimated residuals of the restricted profit 
function against the normal distribution indicated that this was the case (Chen et al., 2003) 
(appendix A6). Due to the derivative property, all further statistical analysis can be carried out 
based on this equation. Hence investigation of the further residuals is left aside.   
 
All in all, it appears there is at least a good chance that the estimation does not violate the 
econometrically necessary assumptions. But it must be kept in mind that for the estimation to 
be of any value, the behavioural optimisation assumption underlying the model needs to hold 
(Biørn, 2003, p. 205). How to establish whether the estimation is a good one? A usual first 
indicator or one facet of the answer is the so called goodness of fit. In a CLR it is measured 
by the so called R2 statistic. It reports which percentage of the total variation is explained by 
the model. The output reports some “R2” for each equation. The fit of the profit function is 
0.65, the fits of the share equations range from 0.05 for 'other species' to 0.24 for saithe 
                                                 
52 I thank Tore Schweder for this insight.  
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(appendix A3). But, according to Berndt (1991, p.469) these measures are inappropriate for 
two reasons: firstly they could be negative since the sum of squared residuals needs not to be 
zero in each equation by itself, due to the 'joint' estimation. Secondly the sum of squared 
residuals is not minimized for each equation, which renders the definition of such an equation 
goodness-of-fit measure nonsensical. Hence the reported values should be handled with care. 
A system wide “R2”-like statistic has been developed, which, based on the FGLS equation 
minimizes the generalized sum of squares, hence after the transformation of the variables. 
Such a measure does not have the same desirable properties as the OLS  R2. Most notably, the 
variation of the fit between different equations is not considered (Greene, 2003, p.209, 345). 
Therefore the measure is not reported in this study. More important than the fit is the 
significance levels of the estimates, expressing the confidence in the values obtained. These 
will be discussed along the way when now turning to the interpretation of the results. The 
study hence proceeds to estimates, inference procedures and statistical tests.  
3.3.2 Interpretation of the results 
Firstly, length class I vessels have a 2 per cent lower profit (at 5 per cent significance level) as 
the dummy variable reveals. It is here understood as the impact of different regulations, since 
vessel length is included in the regression and hence controlled for53. This may be interpreted 
as indirectly showing that regulations have an impact and positive profits prevail. Moreover, 
the impact is different in differently regulated groups. It has also a significant impact on the 
labour cost share and the revenue share of cod, not of haddock and saithe. Due to the 
functional form, the other estimates are not open for direct interpretation. But the significant 
own price parameters in the share equations have the expected signs: a rise in cod, haddock or 
saithe price raises the respective revenue share; a rise in wage raises the labour cost share. The 
fuel price parameter does not exhibit the correct sign but is not significant.  
 
Calculating the elasticity estimates the main focus is, as in the entire study, on the NEAC. 
They are computed using parameter estimates and fitted, not actual shares when possible 
(Berndt, 1991, p.475). A comparison of fitted and actual shares reveals quite good predictions 
for the revenue share of cod. The ratio of actual to predicted share has a mean of one and 
varies rather little. The same is true for the predicted labour share. Larger variance is found 
for 'other' species. For haddock and saithe on average the shares are over-predicted and the 
                                                 
53  The effect measures the difference between the length classes keeping actual vessel length constant. The 
latter is included as an approximation of fixed capital. 
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variation is manifold that of the other variables. Looking at the density of the variables reveals 
that there is a large amount of very small shares. Both shares can only be positive so the 
distribution is one-sided. The estimation however produces two-sided distributions (appendix 
A7). That points at some problem with the model and hence the related estimates are looked 
at with reservations. The attempt to calculate the fitted cost share of fuel from the retrieved 
parameters is prohibited since the group-dummy parameter cannot be retrieved. To proceed, 
actual shares were used54. The same was done for the elasticity of intensity estimates55.  
 
The elasticities are nonlinear functions of the parameter estimates and the fitted shares. 
According to Greene (2003, p. 368) and Berndt (1991, p.475), their probability distributions 
are not obtained easily. Existing methods are mentioned but not contained in Greene and are 
hence regarded as beyond the scope of this thesis. This constitutes a drawback. It appears to 
be best practice in applications to calculate the standard errors and significance levels of the 
elasticity estimates by the so called ‘delta method’. It uses a Taylor approximation to create 
linearised standard errors, treating the shares are non-stochastic56. This method is applied but, 
lacking full understanding, with reservations. The standard error estimate takes the form:  
(XVIII) 
i
ij
ij S
SE
)var(
)(
βε =  (calculated with population average (fitted) inverse shares) 
Finally it shall be mentioned once more that the aggregation of several species into the 
composite ‘others’ may lead to aggregation bias (Squires, 1987b, p.567).  
 
All ‘significant’ short run own price elasticity estimates have the expected signs (table 1, 
appendix B3). The negative signs for inputs imply that the demand decreases as price 
increases, the positive signs for all species that individual supply increases when price 
increases. This required result strengthens the confidence in the model a little. The interesting 
follow-up question is to what extent demand and supply react. Cod supply appears elastic, an 
over-proportional reaction is expected. That shows a ‘flexible’ fishery: fishermen can and do 
react on price changes in outputs. Due to the TAC regulation these reactions do not translate 
into a higher aggregate supply but are best understood as a ‘drive’. It could imply that a 
decrease in TAC, leading to a price rise if demand is constant, may aggravate the implicit 
                                                 
54  The author has not come across an explanation why in general fitted and not actual shares are used.  
55  The short run cost share of capital, an in itself contradicory size, is the capital costs over short run profits. 
Capital costs in turn are defined as the sum of depreciation, vessel maintenance and the interest rate times the 
book value of the vessel (in real NOK) (NIBOR was used, Norges Bank, 2007).   
56  I am indebted to Dale Squires, UCSD, for this insight (personal communication). 
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general problem of too high effort. It also possibly points at a strong incentive for non-
compliance. For 'others' the elasticity indicates an inelastic response while the elasticities for 
haddock and saithe are elastic. However, the values are clearly too high to be deemed true57. 
Most multi-species studies apparently find inelastic responses, which are often assigned to 
either search costs, some kind of fixed cost, or aggregation bias when composites are used 
(Jensen, 2002, p.17). The latter is likely to be the case for the composite ‘others’. The former 
seems not to exist in the current study. 
 
Table 1 
Own and cross price elasticity estimates
Equation
Price
Fuel Labour Cod Haddock Saithe Others
Fuel -5.59 *-0.32 -0.11 -2.18 **-4.68 -0.07
Wage *-3.82 **-1.71 **-0.97 *2.74 **-8.17 **-1.02
Cod 1.14 **1.08 **1.86 **-12.3 -1.04 **0.83
Haddock 2.82 -0.22 **-1.04 **20.86 **-9.09 *-0.17
Saithe **5.25 **0.74 -0.03 **-7.87 **23.33 0.01
Others 0.3 **0.53 **0.39 *-1.14 -0.24 **0.53
 
* significant at 5 per cent level; ** significant at 1 per cent level 
 
On the input side, labour appears to react elastically on changes in own prices. The fuel 
estimate is not significant. According to Jensen (2002, p.19), usually unregulated fisheries 
show elastic responses while input-regulated fisheries are inelastic. That is not confirmed 
here, since the vessel and gear type (though not modelled) are strictly regulated. Also in that 
sense, the coastal fishery may be particularly flexible.   
 
Regarding species cross-price elasticites (table 1), individual cod supply shows an inelastic 
increase for a change in the composite price of ‘others’. That could indicate that some of these 
species are caught together with cod or again point at aggregation bias. Cod and haddock are 
according to the results substitutes, the cod supply reacts almost unit-elastically on haddock 
price. Results for cod and saithe interaction are not significant. Haddock and saithe supply 
elasticities also show a substitution relationship between those two and haddock supply a 
substitution with 'other' species. Also the substitution relationships classify the fishery as 
adaptive: the fishermen can change between the two species reacting on price incentives. That 
                                                 
57 Salvanes and Squires (1995, p.15) get values of similar dimension but offer no explanation. 
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could have implications for the current regime with a collective maximum quota and an 
exchange rate between the species. If the latter does not reflect the relative values correctly, 
the relatively most valuable species is targeted extensively. Even if an upper bound is 
formulated on each species and the stock is not threatened, that may aggravate the implicit 
problem of economic over-fishing. Concerning fishing techiques, trawl fisheries are seen as 
flexible and gill nets as inflexible, since any fish of a certain size coming too close gets 
entangled (Jensen, 2002, p.17). The current study does not differentiate the different coastal 
gear types, but nets are contained. Nevertheless, species are substitutes, a fact that possibly 
implies that the species appear at different fishing spots.  
 
On the input side, fuel and labour appear to have a complementary relationship where a fuel 
price rise leads to an inelastic labour response and a wage increase to an elastic fuel response. 
Since such estimates contain not only substitution but also expansion effects, one has to talk 
about gross complements, implying that substitution most probably still take place but is not 
revealed here. Earlier studies also find this relationship (Jensen, 2002, p.21). Policy 
implications are rather limited, since regulations limiting either factor are hard to imagine. 
The poor performance of fuel price related measures in general can possibly be ascribed to 
lacking variability in its price.     
 
Between inputs and cod supply, the results indicate that an increase in wage rate provokes an 
almost proportional reduction in cod supply. Reactions on fuel price are not significant. An 
obviously questionable result is the increase in haddock supply as a response to an increase in 
wage. While it could be imagined that a price increase changes the composition of the species 
and theoretically the result is not necessarily incorrect, it could also be a problem of the 
estimation, especially considering the result that an increase in haddock price leads according 
to the estimation to a decrease in labour demand58. The other signs imply that factor price 
increases decrease supply and that product price increases decrease factor demand.  
 
Elasticity of intensity estimates (table 2) indicate that the vessel capital has a substitution 
relationship with labour and complementary relationships with all outputs. The former may 
indicate that restricting vessel length possibly leads to extension of effort by increasing other 
inputs. Controlling vessel size may hence be inefficient in limiting excessive fishing efforts, a 
                                                 
58 It shall be reminded that the approximate standard error presumes non-stochastic shares and that problems 
with the fitted shares existed.  
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well known result in the field. The latter suggests simply that larger vessels also supply more 
of all fish species. Fuel and ‘other species’ estimates are not significant but show the same 
signs. All sizes are elastic.   
 
Table 2 
Elasticity of intensity estimates:
fuel demand -8.24
labour demand **-3.09
cod supply **-2.30
haddock supply *-6.15
saithe supply *-6.18
others supply -0.69
 
* significant at 5 per cent level; ** significant at 1 per cent level 
 
Next, the shadow price is calculated using the actual profits. A population response is 
retrieved as outlined for elasticities. The estimated value is 181,476.26 NOK (significant a 1 
per cent). That is what an additional ‘unit of capital’, a meter more vessel length, would be 
worth per annum on average to the fishermen. This should now be compared to the actual 
cost. If it is higher, that confirms that the restriction is binding and quantifies the worth. No 
such vessel meter per annum measure based on the actual cost of vessel extension or purchase 
could be retrieved. But the average book value of approximately 600,000 NOK in the sample 
suggest that the shadow price is rather high and also in the coastal fleet a larger vessel yields 
higher short run profits.  
 
Testing nonjointness: Nonjointness in the translog is formalized as (Squires 1987a p.274):  
(XIX) jiijH βββ −=:0  for ji ≠ , i, j cod, haddock, saithe, others 
This is being tested jointly as well as separately for each species (Salvanes and Squires, 1995, 
p.11). The test statistic employed by Stata is a so called Wald-test which is asymptotically 
chi-square distributed with the degrees of freedom equal the number of parameters that have 
to be estimated less due to the restriction (Berndt, 1991, p. 466).   
 
The H0 is rejected at any common significance level for all four species tested together (table 
4, appendix B4). That indicates that there is economic interaction between the different 
fisheries the vessels are participating in. It is also rejected for cod and haddock. Depicting the 
cod or the haddock fishery 'detached' by a single-output model is thus not appropriate for the 
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fleet segment looked at. For saithe and other species however it cannot be rejected. It implies 
that no trade-off between using the vessel for cod and haddock as opposed to saithe fisheries 
exists. Despite saithe being similar in behaviour to the other two species, possibly the timing 
of fishing saithe is such that it is not impacting the other fisheries, since the migrations are not 
time-congruent. This also implies that regulation of those species by a collective quota is not 
sensible. Other studies reject nonjointness for most fisheries (Jensen, 2002, p.11). 
 
Table 4 
Testing for nonjointness
Wald-test chi2 Rejection prob.
All 131.97 0.0000
Cod 11.54 0.0091
Haddock 28.15 0.0000
Saithe 5.98 0.1128
Others 3.60 0.3085
 
Input-output separability: The next question to ask is if it is possible to simplify and form 
composites. The highest possible level of aggregation is input-output separability. The H0 
formalisation of homothetic strong separability for the translog is (Squires, 1987a, p.274, 
Salvanes and Squires, 1995, p.12): 
(XX) 0: =ijoH β  for i inputs (variable and fixed) and j outputs.  
The null hypothesis is rejected strongly (table 5, appendix B5). The result is not surprising 
either since above nonjointness for saithe and other species was found and separability and 
nonjointness together occur only under rare conditions (see section 2.7.2). Input-output 
separability is hardly ever found in a fishery (Jensen, 2002, p.7). 
  
Table 5 
 
 
Testing for separability
Wald-test chi2 Rejection prob.
Input-output 75.26 0.0000
Cod & haddock 2.35 0.3082
Effort 19.07 0.0394
Testing for homotheticity
Cod & haddock 16.55 0.0003
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A composite 'cod & haddock': By the nonjointness test results, the question was raised 
whether a composite 'cod and haddock' could be formed, indicating an identical harvesting 
process. That they are joint because they are caught simultaneously is not supported since 
they appear to be substitutes from their price elasticities. This is tested by weak separability. 
The translog formalisation is (Salvanes and Squires, 1995, p.12):  
(XXI) ikjjkioH ββββ =:  for i cod, j haddock, k saithe and other species.  
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at any conventional significance level and thus it is 
possible to consider cod and haddock economically as an aggregate. As explained above 
(section 2.7.1), consistent actual aggregation also requires homotheticity. In the translog that 
can according to Squires be tested by (1987c, p. 238)59: 
(XXII) 0&0: =+=+ ijjjijiioH ββββ  for i cod, j haddock 
Homotheticity is rejected. Hence a consistent aggregate is not possible. 
 
A composite 'fishing effort': Finally it shall be asked whether the inputs can be aggregated 
into a composite 'effort', implying that the composition of inputs is independent of the prices 
of species.  
(XXIII) ikjjkioH ββββ =:  for j vessel, j wage, k cod, haddock, saithe and other species  
The null hypothesis is rejected at five per cent significance level so that it appears the use of 
an aggregate effort is not correct in this fishery60. Two other studies, Squires (1987a) and del 
Valle (2003) found support for the composite for high sea fisheries, suggesting to in future 
look whether the result received here is robust and actually derive from the unique character 
of coastal fisheries.  
 
                                                 
59  The theory part treated homotheticity as a property of the aggregator function while it here is tested for the 
profit funtion. This apparent incoherence could unfortunately not be resolved.  
60  There are sone problems concerning the test since the programme drops two equations during the test 
procedure.  
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CONCLUSION 
Fish is economically exciting. It is maybe as close to a free lunch as one can get: a gift by 
nature replenishing itself. But times when the oceans were a horn of plenty are over for good. 
A combination of fishing technology advances and behaviour has brought many of the 
world’s stocks to their limits and beyond. Similarly to other resources like fresh water or the 
climate, mankind must control its activity to prevent irreversible damages. Such management 
needs information: on the behaviour of fish and fishermen. Focussing on Norway's most 
valuable fish stock, the study attempted to characterize the two largest groups of the coastal 
fleet segment. It was to be investigated how optimising fishermen would combine inputs and 
outputs. 
 
Optimising? First the school of neoclassical thought, populating the world with selfish people, 
was questioned. Is the metaphor of the commons' inevitable tragic end an appropriate one? Its 
main challenge in fisheries is community cooperation: the neoclassical model cannot account 
for it. In the coastal cod fisheries, already at the end of the 19th century co-management 
evolved. But their purpose was not to manage the fish but fishing space. When the resource 
became stressed and focus shifted, regulatory changes weakened the co-management. Though 
these developments favour the neoclassical model, no conclusive judgement about today’s 
state was presented. 
 
To not pass by reality when modelling, next the fishermen's world of regulations, markets, 
fishing techniques and fish was described and later translated into neoclassical economics. It 
was argued that a partial equilibrium multi-species restricted profit function was the 
appropriate behavioural model. But that is not unchallenged in the economics profession. The 
casus belli is the maximum quota. Does it provoke cost minimising or profit maximising 
behaviour? It was argued possible both. But the data did not allow creating two kind of man, 
so it was suggested that profit maximisation is more likely.  
 
The empirical results from estimating a linear system of regression equations by SURE 
painted a picture of a flexible fishery. Fishermen strongly react on price changes by shifting 
targets. Vessels are apparently also able to circumvent the capital restrictions by substituting 
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away from it. Cod cannot be viewed as a fishery of its own: fishermen would not harvest it the 
way they do were it not for haddock. This implies that bio-economic modelling of cod only is 
inappropriate. Neither could a composite ‘fishing effort’ be supported. Finally, since saithe is 
nonjoint, the inclusion in the collective quota seems unjustified.   
 
The theoretical analysis falls short by not resulting in measures of economies of scope and 
scale, clarifying the cost structure. The study suggests that the formula in the literature does 
not provide any sensible information. The empirical analysis did not contain ‘actual’ 
confidence levels for the elasticity estimates but an approximation. This is a result of choosing 
a rather complicated functional form which prohibits interpreting the regression results 
immediately.  
 
Regarding the set task to describe the coastal fleet segment, several issues remained 
untouched. The larger vessels in the coastal fleet segment have not been investigated due to 
insufficient observations. Closely linked to the economies of scale and scope are measures of 
over- and excess capacity. These are pressingly interesting considering the hotly and ever-
debated topic of the fleet composition and size. Beyond that, it would be beneficial to account 
for skills, surely an important factor of success and possibly a source of bias in the current 
estimation. Taking a long-term perspective, it would be most interesting to try to model the 
investment behaviour. Academically, since there are hardly any models for the individual 
fisherman's behaviour and politically, to explain overcapacity and judge the transferability 
measures against it. More generally, a better understanding of the fishermen’s ways to deal 
with biological uncertainty could certainly be a contribution to the field.  
 
The current study could be seen as groundwork in establishing the ‘economic side’ of a bio-
economic model of the NEAC fishery. It can also be regarded as a basis for fisheries 
management in other ways, be it for the result that saithe can economically be seen as 
independent or for the ‘flexibility’ uncovered in the coastal fishery.   
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Appendix A:  Estimation results and judgement 
A1 Data summary61 62: 
Data summary (years 2003 – 2005)
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
profits 674 344355.7 276576.6 52725.18 1987077
price saithe 662 3.26 0.46 1.89 5.62
price cod 674 9.89 1.11 7.66 20.83
price haddock 658 5.27 0.86 1.85 9.38
price others 671 17.71 14.21 2.3 64.02
revenue share haddock 674 0.17 0.24 0 1.7
revenue share sei 674 0.19 0.24 0 1.34
revenue share cod 674 1.57 0.61 0.14 4.98
revenue share others 674 0.74 0.53 0 4.03
wage index       674 291430.5 5901.02 283599.3 298088.6
fuel price index 674 149.43 12.02 135.28 164.9
raw materials index 674 82.67 3.47 77.66 85.08
cost share fuel 674 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.51
cost share labour 674 1.42 0.55 0.42 6.68
cost share bait 674 0.03 0.05 0 0.41
vessel length (meter) 674 11.65 1.9 8.02 21.14
 
A2 Visual inspection of data for outliers and high leverage 
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61 The high maximum vessel length does not correspond to the length category, but the latter is oriented on the 
length at a predetermined date, not the actual length. There are only 3 vessels above 15 meters in the dataset.  
62  The high price for other species, a revenue weighted average of all other prices, can be attributed firstly to the 
influence of shellfish, secondly to high value bycatch such as some shark species.  
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A3 Estimaton results for restricted profit function 
 
Estimation results for restricted profit equation
Parameter for: Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Int]  
wage -0,570 0,977 -0,58 0,560 -2,485 1,346
price cod 1,411 1,034 1,36 0,172 -0,615 3,437
price haddock -0,380 0,454 -0,84 0,403 -1,270 0,510
price saithe 1,884 0,436 4,32 0,000 1,030 2,738
price other species -0,502 0,344 -1,46 0,144 -1,176 0,172
vessel length -0,810 0,417 -1,94 0,052 -1,628 0,008
1/2*vessel length^2 -0,055 0,153 -0,36 0,717 -0,355 0,244
1/2*wage^2 -0,976 0,428 -2,28 0,023 -1,814 -0,137
wage*price cod 0,677 0,431 1,57 0,117 -0,169 1,522
wage*price haddock 0,565 0,186 3,05 0,002 0,202 0,929
wage*price saithe -0,799 0,185 -4,32 0,000 -1,162 -0,436
wage*price others 0,278 0,134 2,08 0,037 0,016 0,541
1/2*price cod^2 2,004 0,652 3,08 0,002 0,727 3,281
price cod*price haddock -1,890 0,316 -5,97 0,000 -2,510 -1,270
price cod* price saithe -0,308 0,245 -1,26 0,208 -0,789 0,172
price cod*price others -0,528 0,148 -3,57 0,000 -0,817 -0,238
1/2*price haddock^2 2,953 0,296 9,98 0,000 2,373 3,533
price haddock*price saithe -1,096 0,178 -6,16 0,000 -1,445 -0,747
price haddock*price others -0,255 0,061 -4,20 0,000 -0,373 -0,136
1/2*price saithe^2 2,856 0,222 12,86 0,000 2,421 3,291
price saithe*price others -0,115 0,060 -1,91 0,056 -0,233 0,003
1/2*price others^2 0,574 0,121 4,73 0,000 0,336 0,812
wage*vessel length 3,683 0,411 8,97 0,000 2,879 4,488
price cod*vessel length -2,877 0,871 -3,30 0,001 -4,585 -1,168
price haddock*vessel length -0,777 0,377 -2,06 0,039 -1,515 -0,039
price saithe*vessel length -0,678 0,349 -1,94 0,052 -1,363 0,006
price others*vessel length -0,175 0,449 -0,39 0,696 -1,055 0,704
length class dummy -0,020 0,010 -2,02 0,044 -0,040 -0,001
constant 3,781 1,314 2,88 0,004 1,206 6,357
 
 
A4 Parameters related to fuel price from homogeneity restrictions 
 
 
Parameters from homogeneity restrictions:
Parameter for: Coef. Std.Err. Z P>z
price fuel -0.842 0.576 -1.46 0.144
1/2*price fuel^ 2 0.470 0.602 0.78 0.434
price fuel*wage 0.255 0.176 1.44 0.149
price fuel*price cod 0.045 0.441 0.10 0.919
price fuel*price haddock -0.278 0.190 -1.46 0.143
price fuel*price saithe -0.537 0.135 -3.97 0.000
price fuel*price others 0.046 0.038 1.20 0.230
price fuel*vessel length 0.824 0.664 1.24 0.215
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A5 Correlation matrix for explanatory variables 
 
             |       p2        x       p4       p5       p6       p7 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
          p2 |   1.0000 
           x |  -0.0458   1.0000 
          p4 |  -0.5801   0.2981   1.0000 
          p5 |  -0.1394   0.1122   0.2513   1.0000 
          p6 |   0.2226  -0.0879  -0.2101  -0.1798   1.0000 
          p7 |  -0.0805   0.0811  -0.0017  -0.1270  -0.0294   1.0000 
 
A6 Visual inspection of the normality of the profit equation residuals 
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A7 Distribution fitted vs. actual revenue shares for haddock & saithe: 
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Appendix B: Stata code 
 
Explanation of abbreviations: 
 
• pi: short run profits 
• CS2: cost share labour 
• RS4: revenue share cod 
• RS5: revenue share haddock 
• RS6: revenue share saithe 
• RS7: revenue share ‘others’ 
• p2: wage rate 
• p4: individual price cod 
• p5: individual price haddock 
• p6: individual price saithe 
• p7: individual price ‘others’ 
• x: vessel length 
• pXpY are interaction terms, pXpXh are ½ times the square 
• all prices are real, transformed logarithmically and normalized by the price of fuel 
 
 
B1 SURE regression and output 
 
*symmetry among factor share equations and between the share equation and the restricted 
profit function from the derivation  
 
constraint define 1 [CS2]p4 = [RS4]p2 
constraint define 2 [CS2]p4 = [pi]p2p4 
constraint define 3 [CS2]p5 = [RS5]p2 
constraint define 4 [CS2]p5 = [pi]p2p5 
constraint define 5 [CS2]p6 = [RS6]p2 
constraint define 6 [CS2]p6 = [pi]p2p6 
constraint define 7 [CS2]p7 = [RS7]p2  
constraint define 8 [CS2]p7 = [pi]p2p7 
constraint define 9 [RS4]p5 = [RS5]p4  
constraint define 10 [RS4]p5 = [pi]p4p5 
constraint define 11 [RS4]p6 = [RS6]p4 
constraint define 12 [RS4]p6 = [pi]p4p6 
constraint define 13 [RS4]p7 = [RS7]p4  
constraint define 14 [RS4]p7 = [pi]p4p7 
constraint define 15 [RS5]p6 = [RS6]p5  
constraint define 16 [RS5]p6 = [pi]p5p6 
constraint define 17 [RS5]p7 = [RS7]p5  
constraint define 18 [RS5]p7 = [pi]p5p7 
constraint define 19 [RS6]p7 = [RS7]p6 
constraint define 20 [RS6]p7 = [pi]p6p7 
 
*derivation constrains the constant in the share equation to be equal the own price 
coefficient 
 
constraint define 21 [pi]p2 = [CS2]_cons 
constraint define 22 [pi]p4 = [RS4]_cons 
constraint define 23 [pi]p5 = [RS5]_cons 
constraint define 24 [pi]p6 = [RS6]_cons 
constraint define 25 [pi]p7 = [RS7]_cons 
 
*derivation demands the own price coefficients in the share equations to be equal the 1/2times 
the price-square 
 
constraint define 26 [pi]p2p2h = [CS2]p2 
constraint define 27 [pi]p4p4h = [RS4]p4 
constraint define 28 [pi]p5p5h = [RS5]p5 
constraint define 29 [pi]p6p6h = [RS6]p6 
constraint define 30 [pi]p7p7h = [RS7]p7 
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*iterative estimation  
sureg (pi p2 p4 p5 p6 p7 x xxh p2p2h p2p4 p2p5 p2p6 p2p7 p4p4h p4p5 p4p6 p4p7 p5p5h p5p6 p5p7 
p6p6h p6p7 p7p7h p2x p4x p5x p6x p7x groupdummy) (RS7 p2 p4 p5 p6 p7 x groupdummy) (CS2 p2 p4 
p5 p6 p7 x groupdummy) (RS4 p2 p4 p5 p6 p7 x groupdummy) (RS5 p2 p4 p5 p6 p7 x groupdummy) 
(RS6 p2 p4 p5 p6 p7 x groupdummy), isure constraints(1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30)   
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pi                643     28    .0771184    0.6523    1702.05   0.0000 
RS7               643      7    .5108266    0.0450      51.95   0.0000 
CS2               643      7    .5161299    0.1134      88.69   0.0000 
RS4               643      7    .5730843    0.0961      98.11   0.0000 
RS5               643      7    .2138129    0.1721     173.66   0.0000 
RS6               643      7    .2090048    0.2397     201.32   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
pi           | 
          p2 |  -.5695447   .9774661    -0.58   0.560    -2.485343    1.346254 
          p4 |   1.410602   1.033706     1.36   0.172    -.6154235    3.436628 
          p5 |  -.3801174   .4541085    -0.84   0.403    -1.270154    .5099188 
          p6 |    1.88362   .4357125     4.32   0.000      1.02964    2.737601 
          p7 |  -.5020674    .344043    -1.46   0.144    -1.176379    .1722445 
           x |  -.8100769   .4172524    -1.94   0.052    -1.627877    .0077229 
         xxh |  -.0553529   .1528376    -0.36   0.717     -.354909    .2442032 
       p2p2h |  -.9758473   .4278741    -2.28   0.023    -1.814465   -.1372294 
        p2p4 |   .6767245    .431415     1.57   0.117    -.1688334    1.522282 
        p2p5 |   .5654982   .1855006     3.05   0.002     .2019236    .9290727 
        p2p6 |  -.7993975   .1852229    -4.32   0.000    -1.162428   -.4363672 
        p2p7 |   .2783934    .133736     2.08   0.037     .0162756    .5405112 
       p4p4h |   2.004346   .6515645     3.08   0.002     .7273031    3.281389 
        p4p5 |  -1.889667   .3164041    -5.97   0.000    -2.509808   -1.269527 
        p4p6 |  -.3084281   .2450519    -1.26   0.208    -.7887209    .1718648 
        p4p7 |  -.5279478    .147707    -3.57   0.000    -.8174481   -.2384475 
       p5p5h |   2.952933   .2958849     9.98   0.000     2.373009    3.532856 
        p5p6 |  -1.095695   .1780105    -6.16   0.000    -1.444589   -.7468006 
        p5p7 |  -.2546565   .0606149    -4.20   0.000    -.3734595   -.1358534 
       p6p6h |   2.856094   .2220994    12.86   0.000     2.420788    3.291401 
        p6p7 |  -.1153271   .0602568    -1.91   0.056    -.2334283    .0027742 
       p7p7h |   .5738205   .1212688     4.73   0.000      .336138    .8115029 
         p2x |   3.683402   .4105953     8.97   0.000      2.87865    4.488154 
         p4x |  -2.876503   .8714923    -3.30   0.001    -4.584597    -1.16841 
         p5x |  -.7770532    .376755    -2.06   0.039    -1.515479   -.0386271 
         p6x |  -.6782298   .3491608    -1.94   0.052    -1.362572    .0061128 
         p7x |  -.1754611   .4488868    -0.39   0.696    -1.055263    .7043408 
  groupdummy |  -.0203808   .0100986    -2.02   0.044    -.0401737   -.0005879 
       _cons |   3.781192   1.314146     2.88   0.004     1.205514    6.356871 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
RS7          | 
          p2 |   .2783934    .133736     2.08   0.037     .0162756    .5405112 
          p4 |  -.5279478    .147707    -3.57   0.000    -.8174481   -.2384475 
          p5 |  -.2546565   .0606149    -4.20   0.000    -.3734595   -.1358534 
          p6 |  -.1153271   .0602568    -1.91   0.056    -.2334283    .0027742 
          p7 |   .5738205   .1212688     4.73   0.000      .336138    .8115029 
           x |   .2352154   .0879394     2.67   0.007     .0628574    .4075735 
  groupdummy |  -.0108812   .0554543    -0.20   0.844    -.1195697    .0978073 
       _cons |  -.5020674    .344043    -1.46   0.144    -1.176379    .1722445 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
CS2          | 
          p2 |  -.9758473   .4278741    -2.28   0.023    -1.814465   -.1372294 
          p4 |   .6767245    .431415     1.57   0.117    -.1688334    1.522282 
          p5 |   .5654982   .1855006     3.05   0.002     .2019236    .9290727 
          p6 |  -.7993975   .1852229    -4.32   0.000    -1.162428   -.4363672 
          p7 |   .2783934    .133736     2.08   0.037     .0162756    .5405112 
           x |   .5397696    .136293     3.96   0.000     .2726402     .806899 
  groupdummy |  -.1531532   .0609861    -2.51   0.012    -.2726838   -.0336225 
       _cons |  -.5695447   .9774661    -0.58   0.560    -2.485343    1.346254 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
RS4          | 
          p2 |   .6767245    .431415     1.57   0.117    -.1688334    1.522282 
          p4 |   2.004346   .6515645     3.08   0.002     .7273031    3.281389 
          p5 |  -1.889667   .3164041    -5.97   0.000    -2.509808   -1.269527 
          p6 |  -.3084281   .2450519    -1.26   0.208    -.7887209    .1718648 
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          p7 |  -.5279478    .147707    -3.57   0.000    -.8174481   -.2384475 
           x |    -.68193   .1463608    -4.66   0.000     -.968792   -.3950681 
  groupdummy |   .1316751   .0670344     1.96   0.049     .0002901    .2630602 
       _cons |   1.410602   1.033706     1.36   0.172    -.6154235    3.436628 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
RS5          | 
          p2 |   .5654982   .1855006     3.05   0.002     .2019236    .9290727 
          p4 |  -1.889667   .3164041    -5.97   0.000    -2.509808   -1.269527 
          p5 |   2.952933   .2958849     9.98   0.000     2.373009    3.532856 
          p6 |  -1.095695   .1780105    -6.16   0.000    -1.444589   -.7468006 
          p7 |  -.2546565   .0606149    -4.20   0.000    -.3734595   -.1358534 
           x |  -.0803394   .0611323    -1.31   0.189    -.2001564    .0394777 
  groupdummy |    .024737   .0258641     0.96   0.339    -.0259558    .0754297 
       _cons |  -.3801174   .4541085    -0.84   0.403    -1.270154    .5099188 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
RS6          | 
          p2 |  -.7993975   .1852229    -4.32   0.000    -1.162428   -.4363672 
          p4 |  -.3084281   .2450519    -1.26   0.208    -.7887209    .1718648 
          p5 |  -1.095695   .1780105    -6.16   0.000    -1.444589   -.7468006 
          p6 |   2.856094   .2220994    12.86   0.000     2.420788    3.291401 
          p7 |  -.1153271   .0602568    -1.91   0.056    -.2334283    .0027742 
           x |  -.0774864    .061254    -1.27   0.206     -.197542    .0425691 
  groupdummy |   .0149132   .0255184     0.58   0.559    -.0351018    .0649283 
       _cons |    1.88362   .4357125     4.32   0.000      1.02964    2.737601 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
B2 Dropped fuel price parameters from homogeneity restrictions 
 
lincom 1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7 
lincom 0 - [pi]p2p2h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p2p7 
lincom 0 - [pi]p4p4h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7 
lincom 0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7 
lincom 0 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7 
lincom 0 - [pi]p7p7h - [pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7 
lincom 0 - [pi]p2x - [pi]p4x- [pi]p5x - [pi]p6x - [pi]p7x 
lincom 0 - (0 - [pi]p2p2h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p2p7) - (0 - [pi]p4p4h - 
[pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7) - (0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - 
[pi]p5p7) - (0 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7) - (0 - [pi]p7p7h - 
[pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7) 
 
B3 Calculation of elasticities 
 
* own price elasticities 
 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p2h]*(-0.718486934) + (-1.40905312) - 1 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4p4h]*(0.645806865) + (1.566019832) - 1 
nlcom [pi]_b[p5p5h]*(7.339447577) + (0.184161804) - 1 
nlcom [pi]_b[p6p6h]*(8.460240907) + (0.169819229) - 1 
nlcom [pi]_b[p7p7h]*(1.387413407) + (0.731740767) - 1 
nlcom (0 - (0 - [pi]p2p2h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p2p7) - (0 - [pi]p4p4h - 
[pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7) - (0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - 
[pi]p5p7) - (0 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7) - (0 - [pi]p7p7h - 
[pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7))*(-9.460769878)+(-0.137882963) - 1 
 
* labour demand elasticities 
 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p4]*(-0.718486934) + (1.566019832) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p4]*(-0.718486934) + (0.184161804) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p5]*(-0.718486934) + (0.184161804) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p6]*(-0.718486934) + (0.169819229) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p7]*(-0.718486934) + (0.731740767) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p2p2h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p2p7)*(-0.718486934) + (-
0.137882963) 
 
 
*cod supply elasticites 
 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p4]*(0.645806865) + (-1.40905312) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4p5]*(0.645806865) + (0.184161804) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4p6]*(0.645806865) + (0.169819229) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4p7]*(0.645806865) + (0.731740767) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p4p4h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7)*(0.645806865) + (-
0.137882963) 
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* haddock supply elasticities: 
 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p5]*(7.339447577) + (-1.40905312) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4p5]*(7.339447577) + (1.566019832) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p5p6]*(7.339447577) + (0.169819229) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p5p7]*(7.339447577) + (0.731740767) 
nlcom ( 0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7)*(7.339447577) + (-
0.137882963) 
 
 
* saithe supply elasticities 
 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p6]*(8.460240907) + (-1.40905312) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4p6]*(8.460240907) + (1.566019832) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p5p6]*(8.460240907) + (0.184161804) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p6p7]*(8.460240907) + (0.731740767) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7)*(8.460240907) + (-
0.137882963) 
 
 
*’other species’ supply elasticities  
 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2p7]*(1.387413407) + (-1.40905312) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4p7]*(1.387413407) + (1.566019832) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p5p7]*(1.387413407) + (0.184161804) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p6p7]*(1.387413407) + (0.169819229) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p7p7h - [pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7)*(1.387413407) + (-
0.137882963) 
 
 
*fuel demand elasticities 
 
nlcom ( 0 - [pi]p2p2h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p2p7)*(-9.460769878) + (-
1.40905312) 
nlcom ( 0 - [pi]p4p4h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7)*(-9.460769878) + 
(1.566019832) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7)*(-9.460769878) + 
(0.184161804) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7)*(-9.460769878) + 
(0.169819229) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p7p7h - [pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7)*(-9.460769878) + 
(0.731740767) 
 
 
*elasticity of intensity 
 
nlcom [pi]_b[p2x]*(-0.718486934) + (-0.442169954) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p4x]*(0.645806865) + (-0.442169954) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p5x]*(7.339447577) + (-0.442169954) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p6x]*(8.460240907) + (-0.442169954) 
nlcom [pi]_b[p7x]*(1.387413407) + (-0.442169954) 
nlcom (0 - [pi]p2x - [pi]p4x- [pi]p5x - [pi]p6x - [pi]p7x)*(-9.46076987787607) + (-
0.442169954) 
 
B4 Nonjointess tests 
 
* all 
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[p4p5] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5]*(-1)) ([pi]_b[p4p6] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-
1)) ([pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1)) 
>  ([pi]_b[p4p7] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) ([pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) 
([pi]_b[p6p7] = [pi]_b[p6]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[p4p5] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5]*(-1) 
  (2)  [pi]_b[p4p6] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1) 
  (3)  [pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1) 
  (4)  [pi]_b[p4p7] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
  (5)  [pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
  (6)  [pi]_b[p6p7] = [pi]_b[p6]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
 
               chi2(6) =      131.97 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0000 
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* cod 
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[p4p5] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5]*(-1)) ([pi]_b[p4p6] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-
1)) ([pi]_b[p4p7] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[p4p5] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5]*(-1) 
  (2)  [pi]_b[p4p6] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1) 
  (3)  [pi]_b[p4p7] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
 
               chi2(3) =       11.54 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0091 
 
* haddock  
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[p4p5] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5]*(-1)) ([pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-
1)) ([pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[p4p5] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5]*(-1) 
  (2)  [pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1) 
  (3)  [pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
 
               chi2(3) =       28.15 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0000 
 
* saithe 
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[p4p6] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1)) ([pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-
1)) ([pi]_b[p6p7] = [pi]_b[p6]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[p4p6] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1) 
  (2)  [pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p6]*(-1) 
  (3)  [pi]_b[p6p7] = [pi]_b[p6]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
 
               chi2(3) =        5.98 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.1128 
 
* others  
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[p4p7] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) ([pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-
1)) ([pi]_b[p6p7] = [pi]_b[p6]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1)) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[p4p7] = [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
  (2)  [pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
  (3)  [pi]_b[p6p7] = [pi]_b[p6]*[pi]_b[p7]*(-1) 
 
               chi2(3) =        3.60 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3085 
 
B5 Separability tests 
 
* Input-output separability  
 
. test [pi]p2p4 = [pi]p2p5 = [pi]p2p6 = [pi]p2p7 = [pi]p4x = [pi]p5x = [pi]p6x = [pi]p7x = (- 
[pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p4h - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7) = (- [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p5h - 
[pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7) = (- [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p6p7) = (- [pi]p2p7 
- [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7 - [pi]p7p7h) = 0 
 
 ( 1)  [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p5 = 0 
 ( 2)  [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p6 = 0 
 ( 3)  [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p2p7 = 0 
 ( 4)  [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4x = 0 
 ( 5)  [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p5x = 0 
 ( 6)  [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p6x = 0 
 ( 7)  [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p7x = 0 
 ( 8)  2 [pi]p2p4 + [pi]p4p4h + [pi]p4p5 + [pi]p4p6 + [pi]p4p7 = 0 
 ( 9)  [pi]p2p4 + [pi]p2p5 + [pi]p4p5 + [pi]p5p5h + [pi]p5p6 + [pi]p5p7 = 0 
 (10)  [pi]p2p4 + [pi]p2p6 + [pi]p4p6 + [pi]p5p6 + [pi]p6p6h + [pi]p6p7 = 0 
 (11)  [pi]p2p4 + [pi]p2p7 + [pi]p4p7 + [pi]p5p7 + [pi]p6p7 + [pi]p7p7h = 0 
 (12)  [pi]p2p4 = 0 
 
           chi2( 12) =   75.26 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
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* Cod and haddock separability  
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p6])  ([pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p7] = 
[pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p7]) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p6] 
  (2)  [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p7] 
 
               chi2(2) =        2.35 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.3082 
 
* Cod and haddock versus not only other species but also inputs 
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p6])  ([pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p7] = 
[pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p7]) ([pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p2p5] = 
[pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p2p4])  ([pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5x] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4x]) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p6] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p6] 
  (2)  [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5p7] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4p7] 
  (3)  [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p2p5] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p2p4] 
  (4)  [pi]_b[p4]*[pi]_b[p5x] = [pi]_b[p5]*[pi]_b[p4x] 
 
               chi2(4) =        2.52 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.6413 
 
 
* Separability test for effort 
 
. testnl ([pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p4] = [pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p4x]) ([pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p5] = 
[pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p5x]) ([pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p6] = [pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p6x]) 
([pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p7] = [pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p7x]) ([pi]_b[x]*(0 - [pi]p4p4h - [pi]p2p4 - 
[pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - 
[pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p4x]) ([pi]_b[x]*(0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7) = 
(1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p5x]) ([pi]_b[x]* (0 - [pi]p6p6h - 
[pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - 
[pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p6x]) ([pi]_b[x]* (0 - [pi]p7p7h - [pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7) = 
(1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p7x]) ([pi]_b[p2]*(0 - [pi]p4p4h - 
[pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - 
[pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p4]) ([pi]_b[p2]*(0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7) 
= (1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p5]) ([pi]_b[p2]* (0 - [pi]p6p6h - 
[pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - 
[pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p6]) ([pi]_b[p2]* (0 - [pi]p7p7h - [pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7) 
= (1 - [pi]p2 - [pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p7]) 
 
  (1)  [pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p4] = [pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p4x] 
  (2)  [pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p5] = [pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p5x] 
  (3)  [pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p6] = [pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p6x] 
  (4)  [pi]_b[x]*[pi]_b[p2p7] = [pi]_b[p2]*[pi]_b[p7x] 
  (5)  [pi]_b[x]*(0 - [pi]p4p4h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p4x] 
  (6)  [pi]_b[x]*(0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p5x] 
  (7)  [pi]_b[x]* (0 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p6x] 
  (8)  [pi]_b[x]* (0 - [pi]p7p7h - [pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p7x] 
  (9)  [pi]_b[p2]*(0 - [pi]p4p4h - [pi]p2p4 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p4p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p4] 
  (10) [pi]_b[p2]*(0 - [pi]p5p5h - [pi]p2p5 - [pi]p4p5 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p5p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p5] 
  (11) [pi]_b[p2]* (0 - [pi]p6p6h - [pi]p2p6 - [pi]p4p6 - [pi]p5p6 - [pi]p6p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p6] 
  (12) [pi]_b[p2]* (0 - [pi]p7p7h - [pi]p2p7 - [pi]p4p7 - [pi]p5p7 - [pi]p6p7) = (1 - [pi]p2 - 
[pi]p4 - [pi]p5 - [pi]p6 - [pi]p7)*[pi]_b[p2p7] 
       Constraint (4) dropped 
       Constraint (11) dropped 
 
              chi2(10) =       19.07 
           Prob > chi2 =        0.0394 
  
